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I. INTRODUCTION 
Trademark law1 has regularly been viewed through a First 
Amendment lens.2 As the trademark has distanced itself from the 
good, both physically and conceptually, the communicative aspects 
of the trademark have moved to the forefront. Competitors use 
others' trademarks to convey information to the consumer either 
textually ("smells like Chanel but is less expensive") or visually 
(packaging the store-brand shampoo in the same type of bottle as 
the name-brand shampoo). Trademarks have become part of our 
vocabulary-we talk of"not wanting simply to put a Band-Aid on a 
situation" or about something being "the Rolls Royce of its class. "3 
Appropriation artists use trademarks to make statements about the 
trademark holder or the corporate form more generally.4 The effect 
that restrictions on these kinds of trademark uses can have on 
discourse is justly of concern to commentators, for there is risk to 
efficient and important speech when trademark owners are allowed 
to control uses of their marks beyond those that are likely to cause 
confusion as to source. 
Each of these events involves an entity other than the trademark 
holder engaging in the actofusingthe trademark to speak to others. 
But there is, of course, a prior instance of trademark speech: the 
initial communication between producer and consumer. In this 
1 Throughout this Article, I use the term "trademark law" in its broad sense to 
encompass trade dress and unfair competition law (i.e., for unregistered marks) and to apply 
to marks for goods as well as services. 
2 See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. 
L. REV. 1095, 1137 (2003) (noting that federal and state trademark laws are subject to 
scrutiny under First Amendment). 
3 See Alex Kozinski, Essay, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-73 
(1993) (noting role that trademarks serve in public discourse); see also Robert C. Denicola, 
Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 195-96 ("Famous trademarks offer a 
particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of their owners, and thus become an 
important, perhaps at times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary."); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 397, 397 (1990) ("Some trademarks have worked their way into the English 
language; others provide bases for vibrant, evocative metaphors."). 
• See Sonia K Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 489, 493-95 (2006) 
(describing trend of modern artists and activists who appropriate corporate logos and symbols 
to make artistic, social, and political statements). 
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conversation, the trademark holder uses the trademark as a 
shorthand to convey two separate but related concepts to the 
consumer: a statement that reduces search costs ("here is the 
product you want") and a summary of the messages previously or 
simultaneously conveyed through advertising ("here is why you 
want it"). Barton Beebe labels these concepts as the "search" aspect 
of the mark and the "persuasion" aspect of the mark.5 These two 
functions of the mark underlie the Supreme Court's statement in 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. justifying trademark 
protection on the grounds that trademark law both "reduce[s] the 
customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions" and 
ensures that producers "reap the financial, reputation-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product. "6 
As the recipient of these messages, the consumer is an important 
part of the dialogue. Indeed, trademarks require, at least to some 
extent, an active consumer to negotiate with these dual 
messages--one who not only perceives the trademark as a source 
identifier but who also can call to mind (and then accept or reject) 
the various associations the mark comprises. Indeed, as I have 
noted elsewhere,7 trademark law relies on the consumer's ability to 
engage in this sort of associational dexterity. It assumes that 
5 Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 2020, 2025-26 (2005); see also RalphS. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: 
Legal Protection ofTrade Symbols , 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185-91 (1948) (distinguishing between 
"informative" and "persuasive" functions of trademarks). Justice Frankfurter famously made 
much the same point: 
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to 
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The 
owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to 
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a 
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the 
same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, 
the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
6 514 U .S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(holding that color alone can serve trademark function). 
7 See Laura A. Heymann, Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Professor 
Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 220 (2007) ("[T]rademark law actually places a fair 
amount of trust and confidence in consumers to manage competing associations and negotiate 
among various meanings attached to the same words or phrases. It requires them not only 
to make and remember the association between the trademark and the product or producer 
but also to distinguish that mental link from others using the same or a similar mark."). 
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consumers will see a graphic "swoosh" and recall, without any other 
assistance, that the symbol is associated with Nike; that the 
statement "I'm going from D.C. to New York on Delta" will not 
involve the use of a kitchen faucet; and that despite the absence of 
the word "car" in the sentence "I traded in my old Chevy for a new 
Ford," neither "Chevy" nor "Ford" has become a generic term for 
"automobile." Yet this same dexterity seems to go unrecognized in 
certain areas of trademark law-dilution being the prime 
example-that likewise depend on consumers' skillful engagement 
with trademark associations. 
In such areas, the law withholds information from the consumer, 
not because it will lead to confusion or fraud, but rather to control 
the types of judgments or associations the consumer will have with 
the trademark. If trademark law recognized the active work that 
consumers do in engaging with trademarks, it would incorporate a 
theory of the consumer that sees him as capable of engaging with 
these trademark associations without the law's interference. But 
this does not seem to be the case. The characterization of the 
consumer is still a matter of considerable debate among courts and 
commentators, a debate that often divides along ideologicallines.8 
And, in any event, both the "consumers are savvy'' and the 
"consumers are susceptible" camps seem to talk about consumers as 
passive receivers of information rather than active participants in 
a trademark dialogue. 9 As Graeme Austin has noted, trademark 
law "constructs the consumer worldview in ways that minimize the 
relevance of consumers' own independent thinking."10 Thus, the 
debate over the proper scope of trademark law often focuses on the 
8 See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2051-54 (describing debate over sophistication of 
consumers); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:92 (4th ed. 2008) (suggesting that courts' views of consumers' 
reasonableness may be outcome-driven); Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in 
Trademark Law, 52 ST. Loms U. L.J. 781, 785 (2008) (suggesting that courts' judgments 
about consumer confusion reflect their distance from marketplace and context in which 
trademarks are encountered). 
9 See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. 
L. REv. 827, 832 (2004) (noting that trademark law often treats consumers as "exhibiting ... 
unthinking and irrational responses to branding messages"). 
to Id. 
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rights of competitors to use a particular mark rather than on the 
rights of consumers.11 
This is so even though trademark law today purports to be 
predominantly concerned with the consumer of information. 12 The 
basis of an infringement suit is whether the challenged use is "likely 
to cause confusion" in the relevant consumer, 13 and courts have been 
both more and less solicitous of that consumer's knowledge, 
interpretative ability, and intellectual capacity.14 Treating the 
consumer as sophisticated, however, does not change the fact that 
she is still seen as one who "consumes"--one entitled at most to a 
negative freedom from confusion without the benefit of any positive 
theory that actively carves out space for her role in the trademark 
conversation. 
In order to create this space, trademark law would benefit from 
incorporating a vision of the consumer rooted in a theory of 
autonomy. This theory would acknowledge not only that consumers 
have an important, and perhaps dominant, role to play in the 
creation of trademark meaning, but also that the law should favor 
restraint when the meaning relates to the persuasive value of the 
trademark-an area in which true "deception" plays much less of a 
role. Autonomy acknowledges that the interpretive process should 
be left as free from interference as possible; hence, it is appropriate 
that trademark law have some role to play in filtering out noise 
from competitors that incite confusion as to source.15 But this 
theory also counsels that, beyond this scope, the consumer be left 
free to make whatever associations she wants with the marks she 
11 Cf Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 60, 87 (2008) (proposing that trademark law focus on interests ofharmed and benefited 
consumers rather than competing sellers). 
12 See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 2:33 ("[P)rotection of trademarks is merely a facet of 
consumer protection. As a result, the plaintiff in trademark litigation may accurately be 
characterized as the 'vicarious avenger' of consumer interests."). But see Mark P. McKenna, 
The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1848 (2007) 
(noting that trademark law historically protected producers rather than consumers). 
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
14 See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2040--42 (suggesting that judges and commentators find 
consumers more or less sophisticated depending on their agenda). 
16 Cf Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. 
REv. 2099, 2110 (2004) (contending that consumer autonomy cannot support "a right to 
accurate information or even a right not to be confused"). 
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encounters, even if those associations are not the ones the mark 
holder would prefer, or not the ones that would be optimal from the 
perspective of the individual's intellectual or personal 
development. 16 
An autonomy theory based on the consumer's need for active 
involvement in the creation of meaning and the construction ofher 
identity as a consumer is aligned with the goals underlying one 
theory of the First Amendment. The First Amendment is often 
thought of as protecting the rights of speakers, but it can also be 
compellingly explained as concerned with the interests of 
listeners-the interest in receiving nonfraudulent information and 
in making one's own decisions based on that information without 
government interference.17 Consistent with its use in other areas of 
speech, however, the First Amendment typically manifests itself in 
trademark law through a consideration of speaker's 
rights-specifically, a balancing of the right of the corporate (or 
parodic) speaker to convey messages to consumers against the 
consumer's right not to be defrauded or misled.18 Here, however, I 
am proposing something of a reversal of the communicative 
direction: the consumer's interest in speaking to the direction of his 
life and the construction of his identity as against the corporate 
speaker's desire to control the persuasive nature of speech. 
Trademarks are, after all, simply an instance of speech, albeit 
16 Cf. id. (arguing that "respect for individual autonomy" cannot justify liability for failure 
to provide "completely accurate information in the marketplace"). 
17 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[The] right to receive information 
and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society." (citation 
omitted)). 
18 Other First Amendment analyses of various aspects of trademark law have focused on 
the needs of trademark owners or competitors to speak or on the government's failure to 
articulate a sufficiently compelling reason for regulation. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No 
Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 
S.C. L. REv. 709, 711 (2007) ("[D]ilution laws violate the First Amendment because they 
restrict commercial speech without advancing any substantial government interest."); 
Ramsey, supra note 2, at 1156 ("[T]here is no public benefit, and thus no substantial 
governmental interest, in encouraging companies to select and use descriptive trademarks 
or in enforcing property rights in such marks."). See generally John V. Tait, Note, Trademark 
Regulations and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Focusing on the Regulatory Objective to 
Classify Speech for First Amendment Analysis, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 897 (1998) (arguing that 
trademarks should not be analyzed under commercial speech doctrine unless necessary to 
protect consumers from commercial harms). 
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commercial in nature, and so we might ask whether the law should 
not treat the individual as equally deserving of speech-enhancing 
autonomy when she is a consumer as we do when she receives 
political or literary speech. 
Although it has not always predominated, an autonomy theory of 
the recipient of persuasive communications has strong 
undercurrents in other speech-related doctrines, including 
Establishment Clause cases, political speech cases, defamation 
cases, and commercial speech cases. In each of these areas, courts 
and commentators have identified the importance of recognizing the 
need for limited governmental intervention to enable recipients of 
information to make choices that shape their identities.19 "Limited" 
does not mean "nonexistent," of course, and these cases recognize 
that intervention is appropriate to prevent fraudulent or misleading 
communications.20 But where the speech at issue is designed to 
persuade, rather than defraud, an autonomy theory suggests that 
the law should retreat. 
This interest seems to be much less prevalent, however, in 
trademark law, where it might play an equally helpful role in 
helping courts and Congress to decide whether it is appropriate for 
the law to intervene in the communication taking place between 
producer and consumer through the use of trademarks. In 
particular, recognition of consumers' autonomy interests suggests 
that the farther the doctrine moves away from instances in which 
consumer confusion as to source is the harm to be prevented-the 
paradigmatic trademark case-the less vigorous a role trademark 
law should play. So, for example, doctrines that provide a cause of 
action when the harm to be prevented is the dilution or 
diminishment in prestige value of the mark-theories that depend 
in part on the persuasive value of the mark rather than on its 
source-identifying aspects21-are less defensible when evaluated 
against the consumer's interest in making the autonomous choice 
19 See discussion infra Parts II.B.l-3. 
20 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (holding that First Amendment does not prevent state from 
regulating false commercial speech). 
21 See Brown, supra note 5, at 1191 (explaining dilution theory as based on persuasive 
value of symbols); see also infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 659 2008-2009
2009] THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN IN TRADEMARK LAW 659 
whether to accept the producer's attempt at persuasion or not. 
Similarly, initial interest confusion-the theory that the consumer 
is diverted at some point in the search process but ultimately is not 
confused at the point of sale-relies to some extent on the mark's 
persuasive value for its legitimacy.22 The merchandising cases, to 
take one more example, define the harm to be prevented as the false 
suggestion to consumers that the mark holder has authorized the 
use of the mark on apparel-a harm that, once again, depends not 
on the consumer's ability to identify the source of goods but on the 
communicative aspects of the mark. 23 In each of these areas, 
trademark law intervenes to limit the consumer's decision making 
in response to the persuasive value of the mark, channeling 
consumers' mental associations with the mark and thus impinging 
on autonomy that is necessary to discourse and personal 
development. 
All this is not to say that we should place a particularly high 
moral value on the persuasive value oftrademarks.24 Ralph Brown 
was not wrong to suggest sixty years ago that the value that the 
Gucci or Tiffany's trademarks contribute in excess of the quality of 
their respective goods is wasteful and that consumers might be 
better off if they directed their funds elsewhere; nor is it wrong to 
conclude that overall it would be welfare-enhancing if producers 
spent much less money and effort on creating this sort of persuasive 
communication. 25 But even if advertising causes some marks to 
22 See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
24 Several marketing studies address the power of persuasion. See, e.g., Paul W. Miniard, 
Deepak Sirdeshmukh & Daniel E. Innis, Peripheral Persuasion and Brand Choice, 19 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 226, 226 (1992) (defining"peripheral persuasion" as "the influence stemming 
from stimuli perceived as irrelevant to making a reasoned evaluation or choice"); Richard E. 
Petty, John T. Cacioppo & David Schumann, Central and Peripheral Routes to Advertising 
Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 135, 137 (1983) 
(suggesting that persuasion is particularly effective when consumer involvement is low). 
25 See Brown, supra note 5, at 1169 ("Considering the economic welfare ofthe community 
as a whole, to use up part of the national product persuading people to buy product A rather 
than product B appears to be a waste of resources."). But see, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, 
Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in 
the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1992) ("Far from creating a diversity of taste that 
would not otherwise exist, advertising and the use of brand names is an efficient way to 
convey information that facilitates the process of matching consumers' preexisting tastes with 
products that can satisfy them."). 
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have this level of persuasive value, that is not, by itself, a reason for 
the law to regulate it. If trademark law is truly committed to 
preserving and enhancing consumer choice, then trademark law's 
scope should reflect that commitment. 
II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF AUTONOMY 
A. THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW 
If consumer autonomy is to be a relevant consideration in 
determining the proper scope of trademark law, we must first 
outline what is meant by autonomy. The version of autonomy that 
I have in mind is of the Kantian variety. For Kant, autonomy 
means the conscious ability to make choices different from those 
dictated either by natural law, by inclination, or by others. 26 Indeed, 
as one commentator has noted, autonomy "demands tension 
between an individual and the group, tension that is resolved in 
decision-making."27 The value of choice is not in what choice is 
ultimately made, but rather in the fact that the choice is personal 
to the individual. This is contrasted with a Millian theory of 
autonomy, which takes the consequentialist view that society should 
prefer autonomy because it leads to the overall well-being of 
society.28 In general, the Millian theory states that individuals are 
likely to achieve an optimal result if they are allowed to govern their 
own affairs, so long as they do so without causing harm to anyone 
else.29 
26 See IMMANuEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL 
PHILoSOPHY 43, 89 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) ("Autonomy of the will is the property 
of the will by which it is a law to itself .... "); see also Paul Guyer, Kant on the Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy, Soc. PHIL. & POL'V, July 2003, at 70, 75-76 (providing concise 
understanding of Kant's conception of autonomy). 
27 Bernard Berofsky, Identification, the Self, and Autonomy, Soc. PHIL. & POL 'Y, 
July 2003, at 199, 202. 
28 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 113 (Henry Holt, 1898) (1859) ("In proportion to 
the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is 
therefore capable of being more valuable to others."). 
29 See id. at 101 ("The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not 
make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he . .. merely acts according to his own 
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself ... he should be allowed, without 
molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost."). 
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But a typical Kantian theory of autonomy does not favor choice 
simply for choice's sake. Rather, the ability to make unfettered 
choices is valued as a means of directing the ultimate course of one's 
own life.30 In so doing-in saying "[t]his is mine; that is not"31-a 
person "constitutes himself."32 Importantly, the Kantian 
nonconsequentialist approach values autonomy even if it leads to 
suboptimal results for the individual. 33 As Kant wrote, "[a]utonomy 
of the will is that quality of the will, by which it is a law to itself 
(independently on every quality of the objects of volition)."34 
Autonomy therefore encompasses not simply the ability to choose 
but also the possibility of making what society might characterize 
(too simply) as the wrong choice because it exists contrary to self-
interest.35 Thus, as Christopher Heath Wellman suggests, a 
consequentialist might argue that a government's imposition of 
religion on its citizens will not provide the best overall results, while 
a nonconsequentialist opposes government establishment of religion 
because "this interference with my religious self-determination 
30 Marina Oshana, How Much Should We Value Autonomy?, Soc. PHIL. & 
POL 'y, July 2003, at 99, 101; see also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational 
Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, Soc. PHIL. & POL 'y, 
July 2004, at 215, 220 (describing "meaningful autonomy" as capacity to lead meaningful life 
without unnecessary intrusion of others). 
31 Berofsky, supra note 27, at 209. 
32 HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS 170 (1988); see also Steven Wall, Freedom as a Political Ideal, Soc. PHIL. & POL 'Y, 
July 2003, at 307, 307--08 ("An autonomous life is one in which a person charts his own course 
through life, fashioning his character by self-consciously choosing projects and assuming 
commitments from a wide range of eligible alternatives, and making something out ofhis life 
according to his own understanding of what is valuable and worth doing."). 
33 See KANT, supra note 26, at 83--86 (arguing that autonomy-giving law to one's self-is 
always preferable to heteronomy-being beholden to outside influences); see also Christopher 
Heath Wellman, The Paradox of Group Autonomy, Soc. PHIL. & POL 'Y, July 2003, at 265, 266 
(advocating nonconsequentialist account of value of autonomy in part because "individuals 
retain their positions of dominion even when their decision-making clearly does not maximize 
overall happiness"). Thus, as Wellman notes, "even if all of the evidence suggests that [an 
individual's choice) would be horribly detrimental to her well-being, she remains at liberty 
to make this move because it is her life." Id.; see also Jonathan Jacobs, Some Tensions 
Between Autonomy and Self-Governance, Soc. PHIL. & POL 'y, July 2003, at 221, 224-26 
(describing influence on other moral theorists of Kant's conception of morality as grounded 
in rational autonomy). 
34 EMANUEL KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL AND VARIOUS 
PHILoSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 98 (William Richardson trans., 1798). 
35 See, e.g., Berofsky, supra note 27, at 199 (suggesting that one's refusal "to express or 
realize a dimension of self' does not imply that he has "failed to act autonomously"). 
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treats me wrongly. "36 In such a system, an individual acts no less 
autonomously if he does not engage in self-conscious reflection on 
the process that leads him to a particular choice, so long as that 
choice is the product of his own values.37 This may mean that an 
individual's exercise ofher autonomy leaves her in a worse position, 
overall, than before, but this is not, according to 
nonconsequentialists, a reason to deny that individual the ability to 
act autonomously going forward. Ultimately, nonconsequentialists 
conceive of autonomy as deontological, as something to which 
individuals are entitled, as opposed to resting on teleological 
claims.38 This is not to say that other deontological considerations 
might not trump one's interest in autonomy, but simply that 
consequences in and of themselves are not the deciding factor. The 
attractiveness of a nonconsequentialist view is that it is absolute; it 
does not require empirical analysis of whether the validation of 
autonomy in any particular case serves identified ends or whether 
the interests served in any one case are outweighed by a non-
autonomy-respectingrestriction. 39 The focus of autonomy is process, 
not product. 
Because autonomy is inextricably linked with the ability to 
choose, it is necessary for a full exercise of autonomy to have a range 
of choices.4° From a deontological perspective, the government's 
attempt to restrict the choices available to an individual on the 
ground that certain choices are not welfare-enhancing treats that 
individual as incapable of rejecting certain options on her own, thus 
36 Wellman, supra note 33, at 266. 
37 See Berofsky, supra note 27, at 220 ("[O]ne cannot be counted autonomous unless one 
is actually guided by values and principles endorsed by autonomous reflection."). 
38 See Wellman, supra note 33, at 272 ("The chief reason why no autonomy-related 
amendments within consequentialism will ultimately suffice is because agents are entitled 
to their self-determination, and entitlement is a fundamentally deontological notion that 
cannot be fully cashed out in consequentialist terms."); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 225 
(distinguishing "formal autonomy"-which responds to deontological claims-from 
"meaningful autonomy"-which is more teleological). 
39 See Baker, supra note 30, at 228 (suggesting that consequentialist approach to speech-
related interests requires balancing of competing interests). 
40 STEVEN WALL, LffiERALISM, PERFECTIONISM, AND RESTRAINT 128 (1998) (describing 
autonomy as "the ideal of people charting their own course through life, fashioning their 
character by self-consciously choosing projects and taking up commitments from a wise range 
of eligible alternatives"). 
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interfering with her autonomy.41 Respect for autonomy does not 
mean, however, that the law may never regulate systems affording 
individuals the ability to make choices; it simply means that 
intervention is more appropriate when it serves to maximize choice 
or, put differently, to ensure that others do not engage in behavior 
that minimizes choice. Although these lines may be difficult to draw 
at the margins, autonomy theory provides a basis on which to judge 
the appropriateness of a government's attempt to shape its citizens' 
identity-creating activities. 
As a threshold matter, autonomy theory could incorporate one of 
two theories of the individual: It can view the individual as 
someone whose autonomy is preserved whether he enjoys it to its 
full extent or not, or it can tie the level of autonomy to the 
individual's capacity to use it. In the version I am describing here, 
the theory takes (to use Richard Fallon's terminology42) more of an 
"ascriptive" --or aspirational-view than a "descriptive" view of 
autonomy. Like tort law's construction of the "reasonable person," 
an ascriptive view is not empirically based; it constructs a model of 
how individuals should act rather than how they actually do act.43 
It admits that the exercise of this version of autonomy may be 
"insufficiently informed, self-aware, and self-critical to count as 
autonomous under any very stringent standards of descriptive 
autonomy,"44 but it accepts this criticism in light of its view of the 
appropriate role oflaw. To give individuals only the autonomy they 
"deserve" is to question the very nature of autonomy. 
41 See Baker, supra note 30, at 226 ("[A) state acts improperly when its aim is to suppress 
individual choice as a means of carrying out even the state's good aims."). 
42 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 875, 879-93 (1994) (describing ascriptive and descriptive conceptions of autonomy). 
While both models have their difficulties, the ascriptive model must minimize the difficulty 
that some groups, such as children, will have in conforming to aspirational goals. As with tort 
law, it might therefore be appropriate to modify what is "reasonable" for such groups. Cf 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) ("If the actor is a child, the standard of 
conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of 
like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances."). 
43 See Heymann, supra note 8, at 782 ("The reasonable person in tort law is someone who 
sets a standard of care, who models how the law tells us we should act as we go about our 
lives."). 
44 Fallon, supra note 42, at 893. 
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B. AUTONOMY AS FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 
One possible use of the Kantian theory of autonomy is to describe 
the appropriate scope of the First Amendment. As Ronald Dworkin 
has noted, this justification views it as an "essential and 
'constitutive' feature of a just political society that government treat 
all its adult members, except those who are incompetent, as 
responsible moral agents" who can be trusted to make judgments for 
themselves among competitors for their attention and mindshare.45 
Accordingly, we should be skeptical oflaws that regulate speech on 
the ground that it may be effective or persuasive, even if the result 
is ultimately detrimental to the recipient of the speech. As 
described earlier, 46 this view contrasts with an instrumental view of 
the First Amendment in its deontological basis; it cares not whether 
the autonomy is used toward any particular end.47 It therefore may 
overlap with-but not be entirely consonant with-a theory of the 
First Amendment that seeks to maximize truth-seeking. As 
reflected in Justice Holmes's "marketplace of ideas,"48 the truth 
theory posits that although truth may never be attained, the best 
hope of reaching it is through the free flourishing of a multiplicity 
of ideas, rather than through prejudgment of particular messages 
by the govemment.49 If too much speech is banned by the 
government, speakers will be chilled-not only those directly subject 
to the law at issue, but also those near the zone of prohibition who 
fear that they too may be subject to the law.50 Restrictions on 
45 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 200 (1996); see also id. ("Government insults its 
citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it decrees that they cannot be trusted 
to hear opinions that might persuade them to dangerous or offensive convictions."). 
46 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
47 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise oft he Technology-Specific Approach 
to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 312 (2003) (describing ascriptive vision of First 
Amendment, which respects autonomy "regardless of whether it furthers any particular 
instrumental value"). 
46 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T)he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market .... "). 
49 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (describing "truth-seeking 
function of marketplace of ideas"); id. at 56 (" [I]t is a central tenet of the First Amendment 
that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas." (quoting FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978))). 
50 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 52i U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (noting "chilling effect on free 
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government intervention are favored so that the speaker has 
"breathing room," avoids a "chilling effect," and can contribute to the 
marketplace ofideas.51 In order to avoid this chilling effect, truth 
theorists suggest, the First Amendment should be interpreted so as 
to tolerate a certain amount of uncertainty and falsity, with the idea 
that the truth ultimately will come out. 52 The result ultimately 
benefits the listener-the consumer in the marketplace-but it does 
so by adjudicating the rights of the speaker. 
But no individual's autonomy can be fully formed merely by 
shouting into the wind. An important component of free 
communication is the ability to receive messages and determine the 
worth of those messages for oneself.53 An autonomy theory of the 
First Amendment, therefore, should be focused as much on the 
listener as on the speaker. While the truth theory is about product, 
listener-focused autonomy theory is about process. It is not 
concerned with the result of an individual's decision making so long 
as the process by which the decision is made is not corrupted. Thus, 
it focuses not on the right to speak one's mind free from 
governmental intrusion, but rather on the right of the audience to 
receive messages intended to persuade. 54 The theory assumes that, 
given a marketplace of ideas free from fraud and deception, a 
listener has the moral right to decide for herself which ideas are 
speech" created by vague speech regulations). 
51 See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DMDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF 
STATE POWER 37-38 (1996) (noting importance of uninhibited public debate). 
52 See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1219 (2008) (discussing view that suppressing false speech may 
result in "chilling effect" suppressing some truthful speech). 
53 See SUSAN H. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: FEMINlST THEORY AND THE 
FlRST AMENDMENT 41-44 (2004) (discussing conscious choice as primary aspect of autonomy); 
see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591,610 (1982) ("[B]y 
adopting a democratic system we are expressing a belief that presumably individuals are 
capable of deciding what is best for them."). 
54 See WILLIAMS, supra note 53, at 20 ("[G]overnmental attempts to manipulate the 
choices of citizens by restricting the information to which they have access ... would 
represent a failure to respect autonomy because such efforts rest on a distrust of citizens' 
ability to choose for themselves."); Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom 
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 159, 163-67, 170 (1997) ("A system of free expression based on Kantian 
autonomy . . . would not merely concern itself with protection against government 
suppression."). 
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most persuasive. Thus, the government has the right to regulate 
the market to allow for free decision making on the part oflisteners, 
but does not have the right to interfere with listeners' ultimate 
thought processes. For example, an autonomy theory would grant 
the government the right to regulate deliberate false statements on 
the ground that they "interfere with a person's control over her own 
reasoning processes, "55 although it might be less supportive of 
regulating innocent falsehoods because such statements are not 
intended to invade the listener's autonomous domain.56 
As with the theory more generally, proponents of an autonomy 
theory of the First Amendment must decide whether the theory 
relies on an ascriptive or descriptive view of how individuals make 
decisions-whether the theory operates under the presumption that, 
once false or fraudulent communications are restricted, individuals 
should be assumed to possess sufficient faculties to engage with 
persuasive communications, or whether our inherent fallibilities 
must be taken into account. As Richard Fallon has suggested, an 
ascriptive theory might suggest that regulation of advertising that 
persuades people to engage in unhealthful activities (smoking, for 
example) is undesirable, as such regulation purports to interfere 
with individual choice. 57 On the other hand, to the extent we believe 
that smoking is harmful, a descriptive theory would suggest that 
regulating such advertising may ultimately promote individual 
autonomy because it recognizes the inability of some consumers to 
55 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 354 (1991); see also Spottswood, supra note 52, at 1222 ("Multiple authors have 
posited that we should treat deliberate lies differently from innocent mistakes, because only 
lies violate the autonomy of listeners .... "). 
56 In the defamation context, for example, the Supreme Court has held that, at least with 
respect to matters of public concern or matters involving public officials or public figures, 
liability cannot attach without some level of fault or scienter. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (matters of public concern); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (public figures); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 
(1964) (public officials). 
57 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First 
Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 31 ("To censor speech on the ground 
that the listener could not be trusted to evaluate its content would ... affront the listener's 
autonomy in most cases."). 
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resist such persuasion and frees them to make choices in other 
areas of their lives. 58 
In order to consider whether this theory has any lessons for 
trademark law, it might be useful to focus more closely on the 
autonomy interest as it appears in First Amendment cases where 
the goal of the restricted speech is to persuade. Where the Court 
has recognized an autonomy interest, it has been of the ascriptive 
variety, rather than the descriptive variety that is more prevalent 
in trademark law.59 The Court's analysis of autonomy does not 
consider whether listeners are capable of negotiating with the 
messages they receive; the Court either assumes such a capability 
exists or disregards the issue. To be sure, the case law in this area 
is far from coherent or unified. My goal here is not to engage 
directly with competing theories of the First Amendment, to resolve 
the inconsistencies in the Court's use of autonomy theory,60 or to 
suggest that autonomy theory predominates in the Court's approach 
to First Amendment cases. Rather, my aim is to note the presence 
of the theory in areas in which listeners are asked to interpret 
communications and then to explore exporting these considerations 
to trademark law. I focus here on cases in three areas: election-
related communications, the Establishment Clause endorsement 
cases, and defamation law.61 In each of these areas, the Court 
suggests an ascriptive view of autonomy, constructing a reader who 
makes choices about the value of the speech with which she is 
presented without overly solicitous protection from the Court.62 
58 See id. at 32 ("[I)fimage-based cigarette advertising manipulates some of its targets 
into states of addiction, regulation might do more to promote than to frustrate descriptive 
autonomy."). 
59 Cf Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech 
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 446 (1971) ("Although the first 
amendment assumes that man has a will and an intellect, its concern is that he should use 
them; it does not turn on whether he does use them."). 
· 
60 See Fallon, supra note 42, at 876 (noting complexity of First Amendment autonomy 
theory); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications 
of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 134-36 (analyzing First Amendment autonomy 
theory). 
61 For a similar description ofKantian philosophy in other areas of the Supreme Court's 
First Amendment jurisprudence, discussing cases concerning the incitement of unlawful 
action, fighting words, and obscenity, as well as libel and commercial speech, see Wells, supra 
note 54, at 179-87. 
62 For a thorough treatment of the Supreme Court's view of rational audiences in First 
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1. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. Ascriptive autonomy 
is evident in cases concerning election-related speech. In these 
cases, the Court has attempted to distinguish speech that has the 
potential to corrupt the process-and therefore is properly the 
subject of regulation-from speech that merely has the potential to 
persuade listeners. 63 Although the First Amendment inquiry 
typically focuses on the plaintiff speaker-who is seeking to 
preserve her right to participate in the political process without 
restrictions as to the type of message she is permitted to 
convey-any recognition of a speaker's right necessarily requires an 
implicit recognition of an autonomous and capable listener, even if 
not every recipient can realistically be described as such. In other 
words, if the proposed governmental restriction-typically based on 
justifications such as protecting the listener from misleading 
communications-must fail, it fails even despite the risk that some 
listeners might well be suboptimally persuaded. 
Take, for example, Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.64 
Margaret Mcintyre, under the pseudonym "Concerned Parents and 
Tax Payers," wrote and distributed leaflets opposing a proposed 
school tax levy to attendees at a public meeting concerning the 
levy. 65 She was subsequently charged under an Ohio statute 
prohibiting the distribution of political literature without the 
Amendment cases, see generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as 
First Amendment Ideal (Univ. of Fla. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-16, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365979. A rationality- or autonomy-based approach 
to regulating persuasive communications leaves the reader/recipient as the final interpretive 
authority, as she is the one who ultimately evaluates the communication. I have suggested 
elsewhere that a reader-response approach to intellectual property doctrine may prove 
fruitful. See generally Laura A Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and 
Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J .L. & ARTS 445 (2008) (applying reader-response theory to 
copyright law); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, 
and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005) [hereinafter Heymann, The Birth 
of the Authornym] (same as to trademark law). 
63 See Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme 
Court's Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 225, 266-67 (2003) (describing 
Court's focus on speech that is "unduly influential" rather than informative). But see id. 
at 251 (concluding that Court's recent cases "show that the Court [is] willing to restrict ... 
speech when it suspects . . . that the speech is likely to unduly confuse or improperly 
influence voters"). 
64 514 u.s. 334 (1995). 
65 Id. at 337. 
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identification of the author. 66 Mrs. Mcintyre argued that the statute 
infringed upon her First Amendment right to engage in otherwise 
lawful discourse anonymously, framing the issue from the 
perspective of the anonymous speaker-the "street corner leaf-
letter" whose speech might be chilled by an identification 
requirement.67 The State (and its amici) defended the statute in 
part by referring to consumer protection-like activities: 
identification was necessary to prevent fraud and confusion on the 
part of the voting public.68 
The Court's decision thus pits the speaker's right to speak 
anonymously-whether motivated by "fear of economic or official 
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire 
to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible"69-against the 
reader's right to receive relevant information that arguably aids in 
interpretation. 70 In resolving this dispute in favor of the speaker 
(the lonely pamphleteer who subsequently becomes the hero of the 
story71), the Court necessarily constructs an autonomous reader. In 
other words, by concluding that the First Amendment requires the 
government, at least in some circumstances, to permit anonymous 
speech-notwithstanding the argument that anonymity withholds 
potentially useful information from the recipient-the Court 
66 Id. at 338 & n.3. 
67 See Brief of Petitioner at 9, Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
(No. 93-986) (outlining Mcintyre's constitutional claims). 
68 See Brief of Respondent at 32, Mcintyre, 514 U.S. 334 (No. 93-986)(" [D]isclosure of the 
identity of the writer helps the public to appraise the source and evaluate the value and 
sincerity of the message."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of Tennessee et al., 
in Support of Respondent at 7, Mcintyre, 514 U.S. 334 (No. 93-986) ("Disclosure is justified 
by the state's interest in providing voters with a means to better evaluate the contents of 
political literature."); Brief of the Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 10, Mcintyre, 514 U.S. 334 (No. 93-986) ("Communications 
advocating a particular election outcome which are unaccompanied by proper identification 
carry a high potential for confusing and deceiving voters."). 
69 Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42; see also id. at 342 (noting that anonymity also "provides 
a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge 
her message simply because they do not like its proponent"). 
70 See id. at 348 (discussing Ohio's asserted interest in "providing the electorate with 
relevant information"). 
71 See, e.g., id. at 357 (describing anonymous pamphleteering as "an honorable tradition 
of advocacy and of dissent"); see also id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing 
that First Amendment protects anonymous political leafletting). But see id. at 385 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's view of anonymous pamphleteers). 
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implicitly suggests its reliance on the capability of recipients to 
function without such information.72 Without such a 
reader-someone capable of engaging with speech despite its 
anonymous nature, then determining its value for herself-the 
speaker's claimed right to speak anonymously would have to give 
way. Otherwise the risk would simply be too great. 
The Court emphasizes this point by characterizing the speaker's 
identity as "no different from other components of the document's 
content that the author is free to include or exclude."73 As such, the 
inclusion of an author's identity cannot be regulated on the ground 
that a recipient might find that identification makes the 
accompanying sentiments more or less persuasive; rather, 
anonymity is itself something the reader is trusted to take into 
account. In this vein, the Court quotes approvingly from a New 
York court's 197 4 opinion: 
Don't underestimate the common man. People are 
intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an 
anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. 
They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its 
anonymity along with its message, as long as they are 
permitted, as they must be, to read that message. And 
then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide 
what is "responsible," what is valuable, and what is 
truth.74 
72 See id. at 348-49 (majority opinion) (arguing that omission of author's identity does 
not affect reader's ability to evaluate author's message). 
73 ld. at 348. 
74 ld. at 348 n.ll (quoting People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1974)); see 
also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J ., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("The premise of the First Amendment is that the American 
people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance 
of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source."); id. at 286 (Kennedy, 
J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment guarantees our citizens 
the right to judge for themselves the most effective means for the expression of political views 
and to decide for themselves which entities to trust as reliable speakers."). In her brief to the 
Court, Mrs. Mcintyre argued: "[l]t is inconceivable that the government could require 
speakers to discuss the weaknesses as well as the strengths of their political positions, even 
if 'full disclosure' would lead to a better informed electorate." Brief of Petitioner, supra 
note 67, at 33. 
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This language has strong ascriptive autonomous undertones. 75 It 
assumes that a participant in the political process-the "common 
man," no less-is capable and discerning, and it structures the 
government's response accordingly. It does not consider the wide 
range of abilities or literacy among the voting public or take an 
incremental approach to regulation; instead, it constructs a reader 
with capacity, with the ability to engage in interpretation and make 
associations without the need for governmental intervention.76 As 
one commentator noted, "[t]he citizen/'consumer' in the 
'marketplace' ... is quite capable of evaluating the 'products' that 
compete for his or her attention, no matter how they are 
presented. "77 
It is true, of course, that the Court does not acknowledge the 
aspirational nature of its assessment. It does not, for example, state 
that although the "common man" might be "intelligent enough to 
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing, "78 particular 
individuals may be far less equipped. But this lacuna only serves to 
demonstrate the line the Court appears to draw: When the content 
at issue can be characterized as having the capability to change the 
recipient's mind about whether the speech is "responsible," 
"valuable," and "truth[ful], "79 rather than deceptive (as the State of 
Ohio urged in Mcintyre80), courts need not consider the fact that 
listeners may reach different conclusions about the nature of the 
speech. As the Court emphasized, listeners "must be" permitted to 
75 One commentator has characterized this view as an "aspirational" approach that 
"express[es] an overriding faith in human nature and man's capacity for self-governance." 
Brian K Pinaire, Strange Brew: Method and Form in Electoral Speech Jurisprudence, 14 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 271, 289 (2005). 
76 In Mcintyre and other opinions, the Court has distinguished campaign financing, 
suggesting that disclosure requirements are warranted in that context because of the need 
to avoid corruption ofthe electoral process. See, e.g., Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 356 ("In candidate 
elections, the Government can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption 
that might result from campaign expenditures."); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88 
(noting governmental interest in "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process [and] 
preventing corruption" in context of campaign-related speech (first alteration in original) 
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978))). 
77 Pinaire, supra note 75, at 291. 
78 Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 996. 
79 Id. 
80 See 514 U.S. at 348 (discussing Ohio's argument that its interest in preventing 
fraudulent statements justified its disclosure requirements). 
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engage in this deliberative exercise, as it is "for them" to live with 
the consequences oftheir decision.81 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti82 provides another 
example of lurking autonomous interests. In Bellotti, the Court 
invalidated a state law prohibiting certain corporations from 
making expenditures for the purpose of influencing the vote on 
various referenda.83 In rejecting the state's characterization of the 
harm to be prevented-that listeners might find particular types of 
corporate communications persuasive--the Court again turned to 
autonomy-based language: 
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the 
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative 
merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in 
making their judgment, the source and credibility of the 
advocate. But if there be any danger that the people 
cannot evaluate the information and arguments 
advanced by [corporations], it is a danger contemplated 
by the Framers of the First Amendment.84 
81 ld. The Duryea court's reference to the "truth" of the underlying speech might also be 
read as supporting a Millian view of the First Amendment. Cf Sullivan, supra note 60, at 133 
(referring to "Millian notion that the unregulated clash of individual expression will produce 
truth in the long run"). The court's emphasis, however, on the recipients of the speech and 
their role in the process, as opposed to the ultimate result of that process, suggests an 
autonomy theory rather than a Millian one. 
82 435 u.s. 765 (1978). 
83 ld. at 767. The Massachusetts statute, in pertinent part, prohibited banks and other 
specified businesses "from making contributions or expenditures 'for the purpose of . . . 
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one 
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.'" I d. at 767-£8 
(alteration in original) (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). The 
plaintiff corporations wished to expend funds to publicize their views on a proposed 
constitutional amendment to be put before voters in an upcoming election; the amendment 
permitted the imposition of a graduated individual income tax. I d. at 769. 
84 !d. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 791 n.31 ("Government is forbidden to 
assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves. 
The First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes ... which restrict 
what the people may hear." (citations omitted)); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 
(1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the 
State with a compelling justification for limiting speech."). 
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Here, again, the Court draws a distinction between the types of 
harm asserted and thus the types of regulation permitted. If, the 
Court noted, the state had provided evidence that "corporate 
advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic 
processes" by drowning out other voices, thereby limiting choice and 
"denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests," then 
regulation of such corporate speech might be constitutionally 
permissible. 85 But because the state's claim really involved the 
perceived danger that corporate advocacy might succeed in 
persuading voters-a concern not about process but about 
product-the Court concluded that autonomy interests should 
prevail. 86 The Court was not simply concerned with the "right to 
receive information"87 (against which some form of regulation might 
be justified to ensure that only preferable information is received), 
but with the right to "evaluate" the information received.88 
The Court has not consistently used autonomy interests, 
however, to justify its approach to speech-restricting legislation 
under the First Amendment. Indeed, in later election law cases, the 
Court has upheld certain governmental disclosure requirements 
relating to communications to voters that on their face would be 
inconsistent with autonomy interests.89 Even in these cases, 
85 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. Interestingly, the Court suggests-in dicta-a position 
contrary to that which it had taken in Mcintyre. Compare id. at 792 n.32 ("Corporate 
advertising, unlike some methods of participation in political campaigns, is likely to be highly 
visible. Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, 
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected." 
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6EH>7 (1976))), with Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 ( 1995) ("'People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source 
of an anonymous writing.' " (quoting People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. 
Ct. 1974))). 
88 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 ("[T)he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is 
hardly a reason to suppress it .... "). 
87 Cf id. at 807-08 (White, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that there may be certain 
communications undertaken by corporations which could not be restricted without impinging 
seriously upon the right to receive information .... None of these considerations, however, 
are implicated by a prohibition upon corporate expenditures relating to referenda concerning 
questions of general public concern having no connection with corporate business affairs."). 
88 Id. at 792 (majority opinion). 
89 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003) (upholding 
disclosure requirements in campaign finance context); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990) (upholding statute prohibiting corporations from 
making campaign expenditures from general treasury funds); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. 
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however, the Court has taken care to distinguish potential 
interference with the political process from the possibility of 
persuasion. InAustin v. Michigan State Chambero{Commerce, for 
example, the Court did not characterize the state statute at issue as 
seeking "to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections," 
but rather as aiming to prevent the risk of corruption ofthe political 
process by large corporate contributions to candidates for political 
office.90 The Court offered a weaker, but similar, distinction in 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. 91 Accordingly, these 
cases are not ultimately inconsistent with an autonomy interest; to 
the contrary, they suggest the Court's view that autonomy cannot 
properly function without clear channels of communication that 
eliminate attempts (i.e., through fraudulent communications) to 
interfere with individual choice. 
2. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette. 
Another First Amendment data point might come from the Supreme 
Court's Establishment Clause cases-in particular, the way in 
which the Court has discussed the limitations that the Clause 
imposes on religious displays as a form of communication. This is 
relevant to the present inquiry because the question, at heart, asks 
whether the viewer of a nongovernmental, religious-themed display 
can be trusted to negotiate with the message conveyed even though 
the sponsorship of that display might be unclear on its face (as in 
Mcintyre). 
At its core, the constitutional concern over government 
endorsement of religion respects the autonomy of individuals in 
their religious preferences. Government endorsement-or perceived 
government endorsement-conveys a declaration of "religious 
truth"92 as well as, as Justice O'Connor has noted, a declaration (or 
at 276 (Thomas, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Mcintyre 
should be read to invalidate disclosure requirements in election-related speech "solely based 
on the governmental interest in providing information to the voters"). 
90 494 U.S. at 660. 
91 540 U.S. at 206 n.88 (distinguishing "campaign speech" from "genuine issue ads"). 
92 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. 
L. REV. 713, 727 (2001) (arguing that Establishment Clause prohibits government 
declarations of religious truth); see also Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1372 (2000) (defining "endorsement" of religion 
in terms of "whether [a challenged practice) sent a message that a particular religion, or 
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insinuation) of inclusion or exclusion in the political community, 
depending on one's position relative to the display. 93 Thus, the 
purpose of the Establishment Clause is to establish a bulwark 
against such a message and to preserve individual autonomy and 
self-governance-"the freedom to make judgments for oneself 
concerning what is good and right, without governmental influence, 
through the exercise of one's practical reason."94 This is true 
whether or not the viewer is particularly offended or otherwise 
influenced by the message that government endorsement conveys. 
A plaintiff need not show, for example, that she was excluded from 
some government benefit on the basis ofher religious beliefs (or lack 
thereoO or that she suffered some sort of demonstrable psychic or 
physical harm as a result of the display; it is sufficient that the 
display infringed on her autonomy by suggesting that her 
government endorses a particular religious preference.95 
One might say that the place that autonomy occupies in the 
endorsement cases is not this simple. In order for the government 
endorsement of religion to convey any truth at all, the recipient of 
that message not only must believe it to be true (or, at least, 
possibly true) but also must be persuadable enough for that message 
to carry some weight. The viewer of a religious display who intuits 
some level of government sponsorship but attributes no weight to it 
in his deliberations over religious truth has arguably suffered no 
constitutional injury. If the point ofthe Establishment Clause is to 
religion in general, was officially approved"). 
93 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members 
ofthe political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community."). Although Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented from the majority opinion in Lynch, finding no 
endorsement in the inclusion of a creche in a municipal Christmas display, they agreed with 
Justice O'Connor's explanation for the doctrine. See id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("Those who believe in the message of the nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit 
of public recognition and approval of their views .... The effect on minority religious groups, 
as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their views are 
not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support."). 
94 Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An 
Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAULL. REv. 53, 67 (1990) (citing 
D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-73 (1986)). 
95 See Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1286 (E.D. Okla. 2006) ("All 
a plaintiff need do is view the [state-sponsored image) and take offense."). 
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prevent the government from persuading the individual as to 
religious preferences, one might then conclude that the Clause 
envisions that individual as needing protection. Consistent with the 
election law cases described earlier,96 a truly autonomous individual 
should, perhaps, be permitted to receive all religious 
messages-government sponsored or not-and consider for herself 
whether to credit the government's religious message. Thus, the 
First Amendment's prohibition against government establishment 
of religion treats government endorsement of religion in the same 
way that it treats campaign financin~7 or, as we shall see, false 
speech:98 as a corruption of the process, not as an attempt at 
persuasion. The Establishment Clause creates a prohibition against 
the government participating in the discussion at all, whether 
persuasively or not.99 The individual's right is not a right to be free 
from persuasion by her government; it is a right to exclude the 
government from even trying. 
In circumstances when the government is not the speaker, 
however, the Court's language again relies on an ascriptively 
autonomous viewer: someone who is deemed to have the capacity 
to assess the display and decide for herself whether to be persuaded 
by the religious message it conveys. In Capitol Square Review and 
Advisory Board v. Pinette, the Court considered whether a state's 
denial of an application by the Ku Klux Klan to display an 
unattended cross on the statehouse square was justified by the 
conclusion that, had the application been granted, viewers of the 
cross would have believed it to be a state endorsement ofreligion.100 
A plurality consisting of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
then Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the conclusion that the mere 
presence of a privately sponsored symbol in close proximity to a 
government building mandates a finding of endorsement, even if 
96 See supra Part II.B.l. 
97 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra Part II.B.3. 
99 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 
(1989) ("[T]his Court has come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that 
government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or 
organization .... "). 
100 515 u.s. 753, 757-59 (1995). 
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some viewers might reach that conclusion.101 Justice O'Connor, 
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, rejected the plurality's 
conclusion that endorsement cannot be present where the 
government neither intends nor encourages any message of 
endorsement.102 Rather, she concluded that the effect of the 
message is key, and so the endorsement test should focus on the 
perception of a "reasonable, informed observer"/03 if this observer 
perceives endorsement, even mistakenly, Justice O'Connor 
concluded, then it is a court's duty to hold the display invalid.104 But 
she cautioned that this test-a test that would prohibit a religious 
display whenever "some passersby would perceive a governmental 
endorsement thereof'105-is aimed not at any particular individual 
but rather at someone akin to the "reasonable person" in tort law 
who represents "a more collective standard to gauge 'the "objective" 
meaning of the [government's] statement in the community.' "106 
Such a person, Justice O'Connor asserted, is not an empty vessel, 
limited in his worldview to the four corners of the display in front of 
him, but rather "must be deemed aware of the history and context 
of the community and forum in which the religious display appears" 
to determine whether government endorsement is present in a 
particular case.107 The reasonable person, moreover, "would 
101 ld. at 765 ("Surely some [uninformed members of the community] ... might leap to the 
erroneous conclusion of state endorsement. But ... given an open forum and private 
sponsorship, erroneous conclusions do not count."). 
102 I d. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
103 ld. at 773. 
104 ld. at 777. 
106 ld. at 779. 
106 ld. (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor continued: 
I therefore disagree that the endorsement test should focus on the 
actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing 
degrees of knowledge. Under such an approach, a religious display is 
necessarily precluded so long as some passersby would perceive a 
governmental endorsement thereof .... Thus, "we do not ask whether 
there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether 
some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable 
person might think [the State] endorses religion." 
ld. at 779-80 (alteration in original) (quoting Ams. United for Separation of Church & State 
v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
107 ld. at 780. 
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certainly be able to read and understand an adequate disclaimer, "108 
with Justice Souter's added caveat that not every disclaimer would 
be effective. 109 
Both the plurality's and Justice O'Connor's constructed viewer, 
then, is someone who is entrusted with the task of assessing the 
message conveyed by a religious display, even if that assessment 
turns out to be mistaken. The plurality takes a decidedly 
anti paternalistic view, disregarding rather than acknowledging the 
costs of such mistakes. Justice O'Connor's "reasonable, informed 
observer" is similarly positioned but more generously described: as 
with Mcintyre's "common man," the "reasonable, informed observer" 
is someone who has the capacity to situate a persuasive message 
among other communications and make judgments as to whether or 
not to accept it. In either case, the Court does not appear 
particularly concerned about the outcome of those judgments (i.e., 
whether they would leave the viewer worse off), so long as the 
process ofinterpretation is left free from governmental interference. 
And, even more so than in Mcintyre, the "reasonable, informed 
observer" is truly ascriptive. As lower courts have concluded, she 
would be aware of the various historical uses of the phrase "In God 
We Trust";110 the approximate length of time a plaque had been 
installed on a courthouse and whether the government had 
highlighted or celebrated the plaque since its installation;m and the 
practices of a public school in allowing groups to distribute 
literature on campus.112 She would know the history of Supreme 
Court First Amendment litigation;113 a city's policies regarding 
108 ld. at 782. 
109 I d. at 794 n.2 (Souter, J ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court 
recommended a similar attribution requirement in Bellotti. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) ("'dentification of the source of advertising may be 
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments 
to which they are being subjected."). 
110 Lambeth v. Bd. ofCom.m'rs, 407 F.3d 266, 272 (4th Cir. 2005). 
111 Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
112 Peck v. Upshur County Bd. ofEduc., 155 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir. 1998). 
113 See, e.g. , Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 35 (2d Cir. 2006) (attributing to 
reasonable observer knowledge of Supreme Court's holiday display jurisprudence); Tenafly 
Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2002) (attributing to 
reasonable observer knowledge of history of dispute between city and religious groups). 
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placement of holiday displays on city streets by private groups;114 
and the policies of a municipality regarding the type ofinstallations 
it typically erects.115 Indeed, the reasonable, informed observer 
often displays a remarkable breadth ofknowledge, including, as one 
court suggested, knowledge of the following facts: 
For many years, the Kenton County Courthouse has 
closed on Good Friday. The orders and resolutions of the 
various courts and county and state officers made 
specific reference to Good Friday. The courthouse 
usually closed for the entire day, although by law only 
half a day was a state holiday. 
The observer would also be aware that there is an 
abundance oflocal church services in this area on Good 
Friday. Many churches offer services in the early 
morning, during the lunch hour, and after working 
hours. Thus, it is not necessary for the courthouse 
employees to be off work to attend services. 
Under the Supreme Court criteria, the observer 
would also be aware of the history of this controversy. 
He or she would know that as soon as objections to the 
sign [posted on the courthouse door announcing Good 
Friday closing and depicting crucifixion of Christ] 
surfaced in 1996, the courthouse authorities removed 
the sign. The observer would also know that the official 
posting the sign immediately disclaimed any intent to 
endorse religion. 
The observer is presumed to know that some officials 
stated that they closed because it was traditional; others 
114 Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). But see id. at 59 n.6 
(Cabranes, J., dissenting) ("The majority has in mind not a 'reasonable, informed observer' 
but an omniscient observer, whose experience sweeps in not just what is visible to the naked 
eye or to an aware citizen of the community but the unseen closed-door meetings of local 
retailers and politicians as well."). 
115 See Am. Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 65 F.3d 1539, 1545 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(suggesting reasonable observer might infer City's participation in erection of27-foot, 5,500-
pound menorah), withdrawn and superseded by 90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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that they closed because there would be problems 
getting services such as heat and maintenance.116 
This "reasonable, informed observer" is, as Justice O'Connor 
acknowledged, a legal fiction. 117 This observer interprets the display 
not only through the context of the image before him, but also 
through the context ofthe legal, political, and historical framework 
surrounding the display. He is, at heart, a judicial being armed 
with perfect information, 118 a standard of perception below which 
116 Granzeier v. Middleton, 955 F. Supp. 741, 74 7-48 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (footnote omitted). 
The court concluded that "from the perspective of the observer informed of all these facts, the 
courthouse closing does not appear to endorse the Christian religion." ld. at 748 (footnote 
omitted). 
117 See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[The reasonable) observer is 
similar to the 'reasonable person' in tort law, who 'is not to be identified with any ordinary 
individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things,' but is 'rather a personification 
of a community ideal of reasonable behavior .... ' " (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984))). 
118 In Pinette, Justice Stevens suggested that Justice O'Connor's observer "comes off as 
a well-schooled jurist." Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., 
Susan Hanley Kosse,A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Frarn,ework 
in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139, 144-49 (2006) (contrasting Justice O'Connor's conception of 
reasonable person with Justice Stevens's and noting confusion among lower courts in wake 
of Pinette); Kirsten K. Wendela, Comment, Context Is in the Eye of the Beholder: 
Establishment Clause Violations and the More-Than-Reasonable Person, 80 CHI.-KENT. L. 
REV. 981, 999-1000 (2005) (characterizing Justice O'Connor's reasonable person as "[a)n 
[u)nrealistic [e)xpectation"). 
Not every court interprets the standard as broadly. For example, the Third Circuit 
reasoned: 
We agree with Justice Stevens that assuming the reasonable observer 
is aware of "history and context" when viewing a municipality's religious 
display is "a highly unlikely supposition." In our view, when testing for 
endorsement, we must take into account the perspective of those citizens 
within the community who hold minority religious views. 
Thus, we cannot agree that an observer of the display who is a new 
resident to Jersey City, has no understanding of the history of the 
community, but has a strong sense of his or her own faith, a faith not 
depicted in the display, is somehow less "reasonable" an observer than the 
Christian or Jewish observer who has lived in Jersey City for twenty 
years. It follows that this new resident of Jersey City should be entitled 
to no less Establishment Clause protection than a long-time resident. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the reasonable observer of Jersey City's 
display cannot be presumed to have knowledge of Jersey City's different 
cultural and religious celebrations. 
ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1448-49 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote and citation 
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the law declines to recognize interpretive difficulties. 119 Despite the 
language Justice O'Connor uses, then, the "reasonable, informed 
observer" is not an attempt to assess actual audience viewpoint at 
all.12° Consistent with the plurality's vision, it is a label for a 
judicial determination-based on all the facts and circumstances-of 
whether religious endorsement exists as a matter oflaw. This is 
confirmed by the fact that, as Justice O'Connor's formulation 
suggests, empirical evidence-in the form of surveys and the 
like-is not relevant to this inquiry.121 Thus, in its ultimate 
outcome, the "reasonable, informed observer" test yields much the 
same result as the Pinette plurality, which would dispense with even 
the facial attempt to attribute a view to an observer and simply 
decide the endorsement question as a matter of law .122 
Why does Justice O'Connor create such a mythical being? In her 
view, it is because of the unworkable nature of empirical evidence, 
omitted). 
119 See Feigenson, supra note 94, at 84 ("To some extent, of course, speaker and audience 
must share a context, a sense of what the words may mean; otherwise communication would 
not be possible at all. But the contexts may differ, and in that case what the audience 
understands is not determined by the words alone, but by something the audience itself 
brings to the communicative act: the relations between those words and other things the 
audience knows and believes." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 87 (arguing that "objective 
observer" standard misrepresents how audiences actually perceive messages); Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Case Note, Whose Reasonableness Counts?, 107 YALE L.J. 1523, 1525 (1998) 
("[R)eligious symbols are perceived differently by adherents and nonadherents of the religion 
associated with the symbol on display."). 
120 For example, Professor Kent Greenawalt argues: 
Most people who pass by a centrally located public space in a large city 
probably will not be aware of the history of the community and forum to 
the degree O'Connor assumes for her reasonable person. Thus, it is 
entirely possible that most actual people, even most people who would be 
reasonable in every other respect, might perceive an endorsement when 
Justice O'Connor's reasonable person, aware that the square is open 
equally to all private displays, would not. 
Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion 
Clause, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 372. 
121 See Granzeier, 955 F. Supp. at 748 n.l7 ("The court must place itself in the position of 
the observer, but need not use polling data or similar materials, because the inquiry is an 
'objective inquiry that this court is fully equipped to conduct with the facts at hand.'" (quoting 
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (lOth Cir. 1996))). 
122 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765 (plurality opinion) (refusing to analyze perceived endorsement 
from perspective of" outsiders or individual members of the community uninformed about [the 
defendant's] practice"). 
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the "fundamental difficulty inherent in focusing on actual people. "123 
So one might reasonably conclude that the "reasonable, informed 
observer" test is one of practicality or convenience-much like 
Justice Holmes's reminder that we cannot judge the reasonable man 
in tort law by the defendant's own degree of intelligence, lest we end 
up with as many degrees of reasonableness as there are people.124 
It might seem, therefore, as if allocating this decision to courts 
rather than to the viewers themselves would be contrary to the 
notion of autonomy, permitting courts to make certain decisions for 
the viewer rather than letting her decide for herself. But it is the 
construction of the observer as educated and contextual that, in fact, 
connotes that she is free to be persuaded-or not-by the display. 
The "reasonable, informed observer" is permitted to engage with far 
more communication than an observer treated less autonomously 
would be. Except in instances involving actual government 
sponsorship, the observer is left to wrestle with and respond to what 
she sees. Thus, as with the advocacy cases discussed above, 125 the 
religious display cases suggest a view of the First Amendment (tied, 
of course, to a different clause) based on the right ofthe recipient of 
a persuasive communication to choose-or allow herself-to be 
persuaded. In the election cases, the Court held that the 
government could not impinge upon this right by assuming that 
voters were too gullible; here, the Court holds that the government 
may not assume that its citizens are uneducated. In neither set of 
cases is the Court concerned with whether either of these 
assumptions is true, suggesting that its views are motivated by an 
ideal of how government should view individuals and not by the 
actual harm suffered in any particular case. 
3. New York Times v. Sullivan Yet another source of autonomy-
based reasoning in the First Amendment cases is found in New York 
123 ld. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
124 See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 108 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881) ("The 
law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which 
make the internal character of a given act so different in different men .... The law considers, 
in other words, what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that."). 
125 See supra Part II.B.l. 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan. 126 In Sullivan, the Court held that a public 
official could not sustain a defamation suit brought against the 
publishers of an editorial advertisement criticizing performance of 
his official duties simply because the material at issue was factually 
false. 127 Rather, the official needed to meet a higher standard of 
proof by showing that the statement was made "with 'actual 
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not."128 
As in Mcintyre/29 the hero of the Court's opinion in Sullivan is 
the speaker: the citizen active in the governance ofhis community, 
who may misspeak or get things wrong from time to time, but who 
should nonetheless be permitted to speak without the threat of a 
libel suit. "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate," the 
Court noted, and so "it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the breathing space that they need ... to 
survive."130 Indeed, the Court suggested, "[e]ven a false statement 
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, 
since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression 
of truth, produced by its collision with error.' "131 This language, on 
its face, indicates a truth theory of the First Amendment, a 
description of the political marketplace in which public officials bear 
the cost of misstatements. 
But, as in Mcintyre, the doctrine's tolerance of false statements 
necessarily presumes a listener who is capable of engaging with 
them. As long as the process is preserved-here, so long as the false 
statement is not made knowingly or with reckless disregard and 
thus involves no attempt by the speaker to interfere with the 
listener's autonomy-the Court seems relatively unconcerned about 
126 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
127 ld. at 279-80. Under the Alabama law applied, a publication tending to impute 
misconduct to a public official was libelous per se; the burden of proving truth rested with the 
defendant. ld. at 267. 
128 I d. at 280. 
129 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
130 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (197 4) ("The First Amendment requires that we protect 
some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.~) . 
131 Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (quoting JOliN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 15 
(Blackwell1947) (1859)). 
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the possible effect such false statements might have on listeners.132 
One possible explanation for this echoes Justice O'Connor's 
"reasonable, informed observer": in the realm of political discourse, 
the Court assumes that listeners are educated, that statements 
about public officials will be understood in context, and that the 
listener brings a sense of history to the table. If this were not the 
case, we might expect that the Sullivan Court would have 
highlighted-if only by noting the harm to the plaintiff-the risk 
that the listener might be persuaded by the false statement about 
the plaintiff. To the contrary, the Court, quoting its earlier decision 
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, declared: 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political 
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets 
of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. 
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, 
as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to 
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in 
church or state, and even to false statement. But the 
people of this nation have ordained in the light of 
history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and 
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to 
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the 
citizens of a democracy.133 
Here again, therefore, language that on its face focuses on the 
speaker's First Amendment rights implies an objectively 
autonomous listener.134 The risk that the listener may hear 
132 See id. at 281 (suggesting that it is responsibility of listeners to debate information 
about character and qualifications of public officials (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 
P. 281, 286 (1908))). 
133 Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)). 
134 See DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 200 (discussing importance to conception of free speech 
that citizens be trusted to hear dangerous and persuasive opinions and be allowed to make 
up their own minds). But see David A. Strauss, Principle and Its Perils, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 373, 382 (1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra) (arguing that any determination of "how 
much breathing room is needed" to ensure open discourse cannot be resolved "simply by 
invoking a principle oflistener autonomy" but instead requires "complex, normative empirical 
calculations"). 
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exaggeration or false statements does not justify regulation of the 
speech, even if such activity may persuade the listener to adopt the 
speaker's view.135 
The same tolerance for persuasive communications underlies the 
Court's opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., in which the 
Court declined to recognize the existence of an absolute First 
Amendment privilege for communications asserted to be opinion by 
their speaker.136 Although it rejected an overly simple distinction 
between fact and opinion to distinguish between actionable and 
nonactionable speech, the Court held that "a statement on matters 
of public concern must be provable as false" -or reasonably imply 
false facts-before liability can attach under state defamation law, 
regardless of whether the speaker framed his statement with words 
connoting an opinion.137 Thus, the statement that "Joe's Diner has 
cockroaches in its kitchen" is likely, if false, to be actionable (as is, 
"Joe's Diner, in my opinion, has cockroaches in its kitchen"), while 
the statement that "the hamburgers at Joe's Diner are not worth the 
five dollars it charges for them" is not. This is so even though the 
latter statement may well influence a potential consumer's decision 
to eat at Joe's and may do so in a way that results in a consumer 
making the "wrong" choice (if the listener-or even a vast majority 
of speakers-might conclude that Joe's hamburgers are indeed well 
worth the five dollars). Here again, then, the Court restrains the 
law from regulating speech merely because it might be persuasive; 
the speech must be deemed valueless as a matter of First 
Amendment concern before recipients can be prohibited from 
receiving it. And as in Mcintyre and Pinette, courts do not rely on 
135 Richard Epstein has described this risk in commercial terms. See Richard A. Epstein, 
Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 812 (1986) ("The actual 
malice rule, in effect, is a rule that the law regards bad information as favorably as good 
information so long as it was only produced with gross negligence. It is tantamount to a rule 
that a merchant can escape the consequences of selling contaminated goods so long as he did 
not mean to hurt his consumers."). 
136 497 u.s. 1, 21 (1990). 
137 ld. at 19; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the 
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may 
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the 
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." 
(footnote omitted)). The Milkovich Court reserved judgment on whether the same rule would 
apply to a nonmedia defendant. 497 U.S. at 20 n.6. 
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empirical evidence to determine whether a particular statement 
implies a false fact; rather, they construct a reasonable reader to 
make this determination.138 
Defamation law presumes that those who have heard the 
challenged statement are likely to be persuaded, at least some of the 
time, that the statement has merit; otherwise, the plaintiffs 
reputation would suffer no injury. But Milkovich's constitutional 
exclusion of statements that are not fact-based, 139 and Sullivan's 
exclusion of even some fact-based statements made without the 
requisite state of mind, 140 suggests that this presumption is not 
unbounded. Under these cases, there are some statements that 
might be made about a plaintiff that might well have the effect of 
changing the listener's mind about the plaintiff-either through 
purported opinion (Milkovich) or through the false assertion of fact 
(Sullivan)-that remain constitutionally protected on the theory 
that either more opinion or truthful statements will, through their 
juxtaposition with the challenged statements, win out.141 
This faith in the deliberative process, in turn, presumes a listener 
with the capacity to hear these statements and decide for herself 
whether to believe them. Implicit in the Court's holding in Sullivan 
is that the reader has the capacity to assess the truth of a statement 
about a public official. If false speech about a public official made 
without malice is not actionable, it is the listener, rather than the 
courts, who must separate truth from false speech.142 Like Justice 
O'Connor's reasonable observer and Mcintyre's reader of anonymous 
138 See David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 
CATH. U. L. REV. 81,99-100 (1991) (describing Court's reasonable reader approach); see also 
supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
139 See 497 U.S. at 21 (finding no constitutional protection for opinion speech). 
140 See 376 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that action for defamation against public official 
requires actual malice). 
141 It is true that the autonomy theory does not, by itself, explain the Gertz Court's 
reluctance to extend the same protection to defamation of a private individual. See Redish, 
supra note 53, at 644-45 (offering categorical balancing as plausible alternative to self-
realization principle in attempting to explain Court's decision in Gertz). 
142 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1585 (2007) ("Sullivan also rests on the 
premise that public officials will not suffer unduly as a result of the inevitable false 
statement. For this premise to be realized, however, the public must be capable of sorting 
through the 'half-truths' and 'misinformation' to glean the foundations of 'enlightened 
opinion.' "). 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 687 2008-2009
2009] THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN IN TRADEMARK LAW 687 
writings, the recipient of Sullivan-type or Milkovich-type 
information is presumed to bring to the interpretive effort 
information that can help her judge the value of the message she 
has received. The message itself does not give her this information, 
and the courts, by declaring that these messages are not actionable, 
will not mediate the conversation. 
In highlighting the nod to autonomy interests in these various 
cases, I do not intend to overstate matters. The listener autonomy 
principle is not paramount-or even squarely delineated-in any of 
these cases. And I acknowledge, as David Strauss has indicated, 
that a listener autonomy principle is not likely to resolve the 
complex questions presented by these cases, nor should it. 143 But in 
each case, once the channels of communication have been cleared, 
the Court has demonstrated a certain level of tolerance for error and 
misguided belief through its reluctance to permit governmental 
regulation of speech, a tolerance that, I suggest, resonates in an 
ascriptive view of the autonomous listener. Critics may suggest that 
this view is incompatible with the truth-seeking function of the First 
Amendment, in that an autonomy view not only acknowledges the 
possibility of error but also anticipates it. But deliberation is a 
cumulative process, and it is only through experience that 
individuals can develop the skills they need to interpret persuasive 
communications.144 And in any event, the types of communications 
at issue in these cases-the wisdom of a government policy, the 
adequacy of a religious belief, the assessment of a public official's 
conduct-are often considerations that do not admit of truth or 
falsity. 
143 See Strauss, supra note 134, at 382 (arguing that these complex questions "can be 
answered only by making both complex, normative empirical calculations and assessments 
of the relative importance of preventing defamation, on the one hand, and allowing robust 
speech on the other[, and cannot] be resolved simply by invoking a principle of listener 
autonomy"). 
144 As Rochelle Dreyfuss has suggested, the same interest is present in trademark law. 
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How 
to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAw AND THEORY: A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 290 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis 
eds., 2008) (suggesting that because consumers faced with uncertainty in marketplace "seek 
out more information and learn about other considerations that influence purchasing 
decisions, .... [a]n approach that cuts off learning imperils competition, blocks the effective 
interchange of ideas, and even undercuts the benefits of trademark law"). 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 688 2008-2009
688 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:651 
At the very least, an autonomy justification is worth considering 
even if it cannot be dispositive. And, more to the point, it is curious 
that this view is not as prevalent in trademark law, despite 
trademark law's focus on the governmental regulation of persuasive 
communications, 145 albeit in a commercial setting. 
III. THE LACK OF AUTONOMY IN TRADEMARK LAW 
Although First Amendment jurisprudence seems most concerned 
with the sellers in this intellectual bazaar, a functioning market 
must also have available buyers. It is equally important, therefore, 
that First Amendment theories focus on listeners and readers as 
much as on speakers. But when the marketplace imagery becomes 
less theoretical and more real, First Amendment doctrine shifts. 
Commercial speech regulation is subject to a lesser degree of 
scrutiny under the First Amendment, primarily because commercial 
activity has traditionally been an area of governmental regulation 
that is not likely to be chilled by governmental intervention. 146 Yet 
even within the Court's modern commercial speech doctrine lurks 
a recognition of the importance of treating recipients of information 
145 See Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment: 
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2007) (describing 
trademark law as regulating proposals of commercial transactions). 
146 For an overview of the Court's current commercial speech analysis, see Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562, 564 n.6 (1980). See also id. 
at 566 ("At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether 
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."). Commentary on Central Hudson 
abounds. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 
VA. L. REv. 627, 634-38 (1990) (criticizing purported bases for affording commercial speech 
less protection than other forms of speech); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the 
First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 777, 779 (1993) (describing dissatisfaction with view that commercial speech should not 
receive same degree of constitutional protection as other genres of speech); id. at 783 
(contending that view that commercial speech is undeserving of full First Amendment 
protection "reflects a bias that is undemocratic and intellectually elitist"); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 737, 740-41 (2007) (noting 
criticism of Court's commercial speech jurisprudence and Central Hudson decision in 
particular). 
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as capable, autonomous beings, particularly when the governmental 
regulation focuses on "the substance of the information 
communicated rather than the commercial aspect ofit."147 (Indeed, 
a recipient-focused view ofthe First Amendment in the commercial 
speech arena obviates the need to decide whether corporations have 
speech rights equivalent to those of individuals, since it is the 
individual recipients whose interests are at issue.) Here again, 
then, we see the Court's two-pronged concern: first, with ensuring 
that the channels of communication are free from fraudulent 
attempts to interfere with consumer autonomy (for example, by 
communicating false facts about a product); and second, with 
thereafter allowing consumers to engage with and make choices 
based on the information they receive. 148 In Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia 
Pharmacy Board), for example, the Court invalidated the 
Commonwealth ofVirginia's ban on the advertising of prescription 
drug prices by pharmacists, 149 noting that, far from protecting 
consumers, the ban interfered with consumers' autonomy in making 
choices for themselves: 
147 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A recipient-focused theory of the First 
Amendment is not a recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and 
Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 29 (1989) (suggesting that 
"hearer-centered variant" of First Amendment theory would permit government to 
prohibit speech that has no value to autonomous decision making); Redish, supra note 59, 
at 446 (acknowledging First Amendment interests oflisteners); cf Tushnet, supra note 146, 
at 739-40 ("Recipient-focused theories [of commercial speech doctrine] should allow more 
regulation of speech than speaker-focused theories, given that recipient-focused theories do 
not consider the commercial speaker to have a distinct autonomy interest in speaking about 
its products."). 
148 See Neuborne, supra note 147, at25 ("[H]earers have an instrumental first amendment 
interest in receiving information that will inform them and/or help them operate systems 
based on choice more efficiently and autonomously. Hearers have little or no interest, 
though, in receiving demonstrably false or otherwise harmful information."). As Neuborne 
points out, there is a risk of "rampant paternalism" in determining whether speech is 
categorized as fraudulent, and this tendency: 
ld. at 27. 
should be held in check by respect for a hearer's right to make 
autonomous choices-even silly ones-so long as the choices are lawful, 
and by a healthy skepticism about the capacity of government speech 
regulators to be trusted with the power to control information flow even 
in the absence of a toleration based speaker. 
149 425 u.s. 748, 771-72 (1976). 
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It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who 
wishes to provide low cost, and assertedly low quality, 
services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up on 
his offer by too many unwitting customers .... They will 
respond only to costly and excessive advertising, and end 
up paying the price. . . . . All this is not in their best 
interests, and all this can be avoided if they are not 
permitted to know who is charging what. 
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly 
paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume 
that this information is not in itselfharmful, that people 
will perceive their own best interests if only they are 
well enough informed, and that the best means to that 
end is to open the channels of communication rather 
than to close them. If they are truly open, nothing 
prevents the "professional" pharmacist from marketing 
his own assertedly superior product, and contrasting it 
with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug 
retailer. But the choice among these alternative 
approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General 
Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between 
the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers 
of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First 
Amendment makes for us.150 
In this passage, we see much the same theme as in the cases 
previously discussed:151 the Court's interpretation of the First 
Amendment as permitting government regulation only so far as to 
"truly open" the "channels of communication" -that is, to regulate 
false, misleading, or deceptive speech-but no farther. 152 Once the 
160 ld. at 769-70. Although the case predates Central Hudson, there is nothing in the 
latter case to suggest that the autonomy interest was disapproved. See also Sullivan, supra 
note 60, at 134 ("The Court ... emphasized a kind of autonomy as one driving principle of 
Virginia Board-not the autonomy of the speaker to fulfill his rational capacities, but the 
autonomy of the listener in making up his own mind."). 
161 See supra Part II.B. 
162 See Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (noting that First Amendment does 
not prohibit state from regulating false or misleading commercial speech). 
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government attempts to regulate how individuals interpret 
commercial speech or how they make purchasing decisions based on 
that speech, its activities are likely to be deemed illegitimate. 
In more recent commercial speech cases, the Court's language 
has shifted, focusing more on the rights of the corporation as 
speaker than on the interests of the consumer. But intimations of 
an autonomy interest still exist. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 153 for example, a plurality of the Court reinforced this 
concern, even while applying the more deferential Central Hudson 
test: 
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers 
from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest 
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will 
respond "irrationally" to the truth. The First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of 
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what 
the government perceives to be their own good. That 
teaching applies equally to state attempts to deprive 
consumers of accurate information about their chosen 
d t 154 pro uc s .... 
Thus, even in the realm of commercial speech, the Court has 
indicated that it is useful to consider whether the purpose of the 
governmental regulation at issue is consistent with consumer 
autonomy. Regulation that attempts to clear the market of false or 
misleading speech enables such autonomy; regulation that attempts 
to direct how consumers respond to such speech interferes with 
autonomy and is therefore more suspect.155 As Kathleen Sullivan 
noted, "what is crucial is not whether we are in the world of 
153 517 u.s. 484 (1996). 
154 I d. at 503 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
155 See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 127-28 ("The Court [in 44 Liquormart] would appear 
to view suppressing commercial speech by reason of its message or communicative impact as 
suspicious, even though suppressing commercial speech for other reasons .. . is allowable if 
it does not go too far."). 
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commercial speech, but what aspects of commercial speech-its 
message or its harms-government seeks to regulate."156 
Trademark law is, of course, a form of commercial speech 
regulation. But, as commentators have noted, current doctrine does 
not explicitly incorporate First Amendment values157 or give 
prominence to a positive view of consumer interests.158 Where First 
Amendment issues do arise, the defendant is typically using the 
plaintiff's trademark to engage in some sort of expressive activity, 
such as parody or commentary.159 This is not to say, however, that 
autonomy interests cannot be used to explain certain existing 
aspects of trademark doctrine-namely, those instances in which a 
court declines to enjoin the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark 
despite evidence (or a presumption) that some consumers will be 
confused.160 In such cases, as in the cases discussed earlier/61 the 
result might be justified by viewing consumers as adaptable, 
particularly in today's marketplace, and therefore able to be 
entrusted with figuring out how to engage with shifting trademark 
meanings. 162 For example, when a court declares that a formerly 
trademarked term has become generic, it is necessarily assuming 
that consumers for whom that term still bears trademark 
166 Id. at 128; see also id. at 144 n.81 (citing cases outside commercial speech area in 
which "interference with the communicative impact of speech [has) also triggered the Court's 
concern"). 
157 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 146, at 744 (arguing that current trademark doctrine 
fails to implement First Amendment norms). 
158 See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 11, at 61-62 ("Trademark's traditional seller-conflict 
account gives insufficient weight to the interests of nonconfused consumers and their 
potential losses ... ."). 
159 See, e.g., Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(considering use of "Barbie" trademark in pop song). 
160 See Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 
(2d Cir. 1989) ("[S)omewhat more risk of confusion is to be tolerated when a trademark holder 
seeks to enjoin artistic expression such as a parody .... "). 
161 See supra Part II.B. 
162 Indeed, some commentators, myself included, have taken the view that consumers are 
primarily responsible for the creation and development of trademark meaning. See, e.g., 
ROSEMARY J . COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSIDP, 
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 8 (1998) (attributing meaning of brand to "expressive work of 
consumers"); Beebe, supra note 5, at 2021 ("Trademarks exist only to the extent that 
consumers perceive them as designations of source. Infringement occurs only to the extent 
that consumers perceive one trademark as referring to the source of another."); Heymann, 
The Birth of the Authornym, supra note 62, at 1423 (suggesting that trademark's meaning 
depends on consumers' interpretation). 
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significance will either adopt the new meaning of the term or suffer 
from some cognitive dissonance. 163 Similarly, the "descriptive fair 
use" provision of the Lanham Act, which permits the use of 
another's trademark "otherwise than as a mark" so long as the mark 
is "descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe 
the [defendant's] goods or services ... or their geographic origin,"164 
assumes some level of consumer confusion will be present when a 
defendant uses another's trademark in its descriptive sense.165 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently articulated, there would be 
no need for the defense at all were this not the case.166 
Thus, the existence of the defense indicates some level of 
confidence in the consumer. Whatever confusion may exist, it does 
not rise to the level at which courts must step in and protect the 
consumer-she will inevitably figure out which use of the term is as 
a trademark and which use is merely descriptive. And the 
touchstone for any trademark infringement case-whether the 
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark is likely to cause confusion 
among the relevant consumer base-itself incorporates a mild 
antipaternalism in that it responds only to a certain level of 
confusion by the "reasonably prudent consumer," not to every 
instance of confusion that a consumer might experience.167 But in 
each of these examples, whatever autonomy interest exists is 
passive-if anything, it is a post hoc explanation of the effect of a 
court's decision not to grant the trademark holder the relief it seeks. 
Absent from the cases is a more positive theory of the consumer, 
163 See Grynberg, supra note 11, at 115 ("Declaring a mark generic ... raises the search 
costs of consumers who still use the term in question as a trademark."). 
164 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
165 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004). 
166 See id. at 120 ("[l]t would make no sense to give the defendant a defense of showing 
affirmatively that the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving [confusion]; all the defendant needs 
to do is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded that the plaintiff has carried its own burden on 
that point."); see also Tushnet, supra note 146, at 74344 (describing doctrines in trademark 
law "designed to separate legitimate from illegitimate sources of misunderstanding"). 
167 See Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(describing "reasonably prudent consumer" test); 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 32:188 ("The 
lowest reported figure [of confusion] is 8.5 percent, which the court found to be 'strong 
evidence' of a likelihood of confusion where other evidence was also strongly supportive."); 
Tushnet, supra note 146, at 744 (explaining that courts "discount confusion that results from 
pure miscomprehension"). 
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similar to that found in the First Amendment cases described 
earlier, 168 that justifies narrowing the scope of trademark law on the 
ground that it restricts consumer autonomy. 
How might such a theory operate in practice? We might begin, 
as suggested earlier/69 by separating the two messages that are 
communicated by a trademark: the message that indicates to the 
consumer the source of the good or service ("here's what you want") 
and the message that embodies the goodwill of the producer ("here's 
why you want it").170 Having done so, we can align each of these 
messages with a type of speech common to First Amendment cases. 
The source message is akin to a statement of fact, the falsity of 
which constitutes a corruption of the communicative process, and 
the goodwill message is akin to a statement of opinion or 
persuasion, which relates to the ultimate decision made by the 
recipient of the message. When a consumer relies on the first 
message, she is making a choice between producers in the 
marketplace; when she relies on the second message, she is 
contributing-in however small a way-to the course ofher own life 
and the identity that she constructs through that choice. To take 
one example, a consumer engages with the Coca-Cola trademark in 
two ways: first, to ensure that she is buying Coca-Cola and not 
Pepsi (the source-identifying function), and second, to constitute 
herself as someone who drinks Coca-Cola and not Pepsi at that 
particular moment (the persuasion function), whether because of 
personal taste, image, perception of corporate practices, or any other 
reason.171 A consideration of consumer autonomy would therefore 
counsel that governmental regulation (through trademark law) is 
much more appropriate when addressing the former message than 
it is when addressing the latter. Thus, as Martin Redish explains, 
"if an individual wishes to buy a car because he believes it will make 
168 See supra Part II.B. 
169 See supra Part I. 
17° Cf Beebe, supra note 5, at 2025 (defining "search sophistication" and "persuasion 
sophistication"). 
171 Jessica Litman has identified an instance where the trademark becomes mostly a 
matter of persuasion: "the effort and expense that goes into distinguishing a Ford Taurus 
from a Mercury Sable and persuading customers to buy one rather than the other, when, after 
all, they're essentially the same car." Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public 
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (1999). 
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him look masculine,"172 it is difficult, on an autonomy rationale, to 
see why the law should restrict that choice, even if we might hope 
that the decision rests on a weightier ground.173 "Recognition of the 
individual's unencumbered right to make life-affecting decisions," 
Redish notes, "logically precludes the determination by external 
forces that certain grounds upon which to make such decisions are 
better than or preferable to others."174 
The modern trademark is a far different creation from its earlier 
incarnation, when a trademark conveyed only a source-identifying 
message, consistent with its origin as a guild marker.175 With the 
development of advertising techniques starting in the 1920s, 
trademarks moved from functioning primarily at the point of sale 
(i.e., as a heuristic for repeat customers) to having a psychological 
effect on consumers well before the consummation of any actual sale 
and a lingering effect thereafter.176 Many who will never own a 
172 Redish, supra note 53, at 619. 
173 Id. at 630 (describing effect of autonomy as self-realization on commercial speech 
doctrine); see also Neuborne, supra note 147, at 29 ("[T]he toleration based respect for 
individual dignity that fuels speaker-centered speech protection should also lead to a refusal 
to permit the government to manipulate hearers into 'preferred' choices by controlling the 
flow of information to them."); Smolla, supra note 146, at 786 ("In an open society there is 
always pressure to believe that money and material will give life meaning. The very 
openness, however, that ... encourages advertisers to try to make us all materialists[ 1 will 
also give free wheel to the intellectual and entrepreneurial imaginations that hold the best 
promise for genuinely uplifting our quality oflife. "). But see, e.g., Ronald KL. Collins & David 
M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEx. L. REV. 697, 745 (1993) (noting "dissonance 
between today's commercial expression and the noble purposes of the First Amendment"); 
Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising, 
Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEA TILE U. L. REV. 377, 381 (2001) 
(suggesting First Amendment protection of advertising should be reevaluated because 
advertising often appeals to addictive impulses). 
174 Redish, supra note 53, at 630 n.135. I am not suggesting that a consideration of 
autonomy-related interests should eliminate any constitutional protection for commercial 
speech whatsoever. Cf, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory 
of Freedom, 62 IOWAL. REv. 1, 3 (1976) ("[A] complete denial of first amendment protection 
for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment 
theory."). 
175 See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 
TRADEMARK REP. 943,963 (2006) (describing trademark as serving three possible functions: 
"liability" (identifying responsible artisan); "preclusive" (establishing boundaries of guild's 
monopoly); or "ownership" (facilitating recovery of goods)); see also id. at 964 (noting shift in 
early twentieth century in trademark's function from source signal to quality). 
176 See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 761 (1990) 
("Successful trademarks are valuable because of the information that they convey. The 
consumer sees the mark and knows what the mark represents: a consistent quality, a 
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Rolls Royce have some sort of perception associated with the mark, 
and at least some of those who do own one have a continuing 
engagement with the mark each time they drive around town. 
Moreover, as earlier noted, trademarks have recently taken on yet 
another communicative function: as an element of cultural 
discourse. 177 Trademarks are now used as a linguistic shorthand in 
addition to an economic one, as a way of describing something more 
efficiently or creating a shared discourse through a common cultural 
referent. When we hear about something being as difficult as 
"nailing Jell-0 to the wall" or refer to something as the "Cadillac of 
its class," those of us who are familiar with the product and its 
advertising persona understand what the speaker is saying. When 
a manufacturer engages in comparative advertising, the trademark 
is being used to communicate the meaning of the mark, separate 
from its function as an indicator of the source of the good or service. 
But none of these uses interferes with the consumer's ability to find 
the goods or services she wants. 
Even though an element of discourse underlies all of these 
personas, focusing only on the rights of speakers-either the 
trademark holders or competitors speaking to consumers, or the 
consumers unmooring the trademark from its direct connection to 
the good and using it to speak to others-seems to miss another 
important focus: the rights of consumers as listeners and readers. 
As demonstrated by Julie Cohen and Jessica Litman in the 
copyright sphere, there is also a role for the consumer to "talk back" 
to the trademark directly in its first persona, a role with First 
Amendment-type implications.178 This conversation occurs because 
reputation for service, and any of the other things that when wrapped together are thought 
of as a business's goodwill."). 
177 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1710-13 (1999) (noting 
encroachment of trademark law on social discourse); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of 
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 134 (1993) (noting 
costs of publicity rights on free expression and cultural pluralism). 
178 See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 34 7, 370 (2005) (describing"situated user" as concerned with "pathways to consumption" 
rather than simply "the fact of consumption"); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEx. 
L. REv. 1871, 1878 (2007) (calling for increased attention to role of readers and listeners in 
copyright law); cf Mad ow, supra note 177, at 134 ("Publicity rights are about .... who gets 
to decide what 'Madonna' will mean in our culture: what meaning(s) her image will be used 
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trademark law is not-despite the language used by some 
commentators179 -about regulating certain words; rather, it is about 
protecting certain associations with those words. Under an 
infringement rationale, the term "Delta" may be associated with 
both an airline and faucets but probably not with an airport shuttle 
service or kitchen sinks. Under a dilution rationale, the term 
"Kodak" may be associated with film and cameras but not with 
pianos. Trademark law essentially tells consumers which 
associations are permissible and which are not.180 
Thus, to the extent we are willing to recognize an autonomy 
interest in trademark law-the same autonomy interest underlying 
First Amendment cases involving other mental associations and 
persuasive communications-we should encourage the same 
construction of self-image through choice by exhibiting greater 
skepticism of aspects of trademark law that interfere with that 
autonomy.181 This would suggest that trademark law is more 
defensible when it is focused on confusing or misleading uses of 
to generate and circulate, and what meaning(s) she will have for us."). 
179 See, e.g., ROGER SHUY, LINGWSTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 2 (2002) 
("[T]rademark law is about the right to monopolize the use of language."); Carter, supra 
note 176, at 769 ("Trademark protection matters because it allows a firm to remove a word 
from the market language, in the sense that it allows the firm to prevent others from using 
the word or anything confusingly similar to it. This creates what might be called language 
exclusivity."). 
180 The Supreme Court's recent trademark jurisprudence might be read as suggesting, if 
not an outright respect for consumer autonomy, at least the notion that consumers are not 
in need of as much protection as some trademark holders contend. See, e.g., KP Permanent 
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004) ("[T]he common law of 
unfair competition ... tolerated some degree of confusion from a descriptive use of words 
contained in another person's trademark."); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 
U.S. 418, 433 (2003) ("[T]he mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's 
mark with a famous mark ... will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to 
identify the goods of its owner .... "),superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark 
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 207 (2004) 
(characterizing Rehnquist Court as viewing "certainty for competitors-rather than 
consumers, as one might expect of trademark law" -as important consideration). 
181 Cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1087 
n.155 (2000) ("If speech is constitutionally protected even if it intends to influence people's 
conduct by ... partisan shading of the facts, then it's hard to see why it should become 
unprotected just because its recipients plan to use it to influence consumers' buying habits." 
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)). 
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marks and much less defensible when it is focused on controlling 
associations with marks for reasons beyond their confusing or 
misleading effects.182 
From a linguistic perspective, trademarks are constructed by the 
consumer. Although linguistics recognizes that a certain degree of 
shared meaning must exist in order for communications to be 
effective, 183 it also incorporates an insight from literary criticism's 
reader response theory: the idea that readers have as much control 
over meaning as writers.184 To borrow from Barthian semiotics, 185 
trademarks involve both "connotation" and "denotation." 
"Denotation," as a system of signification, describes the process by 
which the signifier "rock" relates to the signified "a mineral 
formation in consolidated form"; "connotation" exists as a second 
layer, in which meaning depends on context or social construction, 
thus describing the process in which "rock" relates to the signified 
"a large diamond, usually on a ring."186 As Stuart Hall notes, 
although communication requires some alignment between the 
speaker's desired meaning and the reader's received meaning, the 
reader need not accept the desired meaning full stop: he can adjust 
the meaning or-in some cases-oppose it altogether. 187 The latter 
182 Cf. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 146, at 635 (arguing that advent of modern 
advertising dispels Court's assumption in Virginia Pharmacy Board that truth of commercial 
speech is more easily verifiable). But see Va. State Bd. ofPharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 7 48, 771 n.24 (1976) (suggesting that commercial speech is more easily 
verifiable than other types of speech because advertiser presumably knows more about 
products or services he provides than others). 
183 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS 
L.J. 61, 89 (2006) ("Although every speaker may not define a term identically, for words to 
have meaning, the definition must stay within a common boundary when referring to 
reality."). 
184 See Dave Morley, Text, Readers, Subjects, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE 163, 171 
(Stuart Hallet al. eds., 1980) ("The meaning(s) of a text will also be constructed differently 
depending on the discourses (knowledges, prejudices, resistances) brought to bear on the text 
by the reader."). 
185 For an analysis of Roland Barthes's theory distinguishing orders of signification, see 
JOHN FISKE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 90-91 (1982). 
188 See Stuart Hall, Encoding I Decoding, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE, supra 
note 184, at 128, 132-33 (describing and distinguishing between denotation and connotation); 
Marina Camargo Heck, The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages, in CULTURE, MEDIA, 
LANGUAGE, supra note 184, at 122, 124 (same). 
187 See Hall, supra note 186, at 136-38 (discussing three hypothetical positions of viewers 
in televisual discourse including "negotiated" and "oppositional" codes). 
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case is where what Hall calls "the 'politics of signification'-the 
struggle in discourse" -exists.188 
The marketing literature and the practices that it reflects 
suggest a similar preference for consumer autonomy in engaging 
with the persuasive value oftrademarks. In 1960, Robert J. Keith, 
a director of the Pillsbury Company, wrote a short but influential 
description of the modern "marketing revolution," suggesting that 
"[c]ompanies revolve around the customer, not the other way 
around. "189 The company's purpose was no longer to create products 
consistent with its available resources, argued Keith, "but to satisfy 
the needs and desires, both actual and potential, of our 
customers. "190 Modern advertising underwent a similar shift. 
Advertisers no longer rely on simply communicating facts about a 
product, in the model of the old Sears catalog or the advertisement 
for a mercantile shop;191 now they require consumers to do 
interpretive work involving wordplay, metaphor, and cultural 
meaning. Indeed, as Linda Scott notes, engaging with advertising 
has always been part of literary culture, in the ways in which 
consumers read advertisements as well as in the way advertising 
transmits culture.192 Today's advertising often emphasizes subtlety 
188 Id. at 138. 
189 Robert J. Keith, The Marketing Revolution, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1960, at 35, 35. More 
recent commentators have suggested that the idea of a "revolution" in marketing is a fallacy 
and that such consumer-centric notions existed even in what Keith described as the 
"production era." I d. at 36; see also, e.g., D.G. Brian Jones & Alan J. Richardson, The Myth 
of the Marketing Revolution, 27 J. MACROMARKETING 15, 22 (2007) ("Clear and significant 
evidence suggests that ideas and practices characteristic of the sales and marketing eras 
existed during the time when a production orientation is commonly believed to have 
dominated business practice."). 
190 Keith, supra note 189, at 37. 
191 See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 
N .M. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2008) (describing shifting focus of twentieth-century advertising from 
dissemination of information to appealing to consumers' emotions); Collins & Skover, supra 
note 173, at 702--{)3 (identifying shift from "product-information advertising" to "product-
image advertising" between 1920s and early 1950s). 
192 See Linda M. Scott, Images in Advertising: The Need for a Theory of Visual 
Rhetoric, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 252, 261 (1994) [hereinafter Scott, Images in Advertising] ("It 
is an important by-product of advertising that a range of art styles are made part of the 
common language of the populace."); Linda M. Scott, Spectacular Vernacular: Literacy and 
Commercial Culture in the Postmodern Age, 10 INT'L J. RES. MARKETING 251, 261 (1993) 
("Advertisements [in newspapers], like other printed matter, were originally read aloud to 
groups at home, at work, or in public meeting places like taverns and coffee houses."). 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 700 2008-2009
700 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:651 
and imagery over direct transmission of factual information, 
requiring consumers to engage in interpretive acts similar to those 
used with novels or artwork.193 
In order for this shift in control over brand meaning and 
interpretation to work, marketers must grant consumers a fair 
amount of autonomy in their decision making. This is not to say 
that producers do not expend considerable effort and resources in 
attempting to influence that decision-indeed, it is precisely because 
of the autonomy of consumers that producers must invest such 
funds. In the 1950s, a significant critique of advertising suggested 
that consumers did not possess a sufficient degree of autonomy to 
resist the siren call of advertisers.194 But more recent examples in 
the marketing literature seem to suggest a recognition of-if not a 
preference for-autonomy. 195 This autonomy, not surprisingly, is 
linked-as it is in the philosophical literature196-to choice and 
decision making.197 This literature recognizes that consumers' 
engagement with advertising is part of an ongoing dialogue in which 
consumers are not merely passive receptacles for advertising 
messages, but-whether consciously or not-accept, respond, or 
reject the messages they receive.198 This seems to be true whether 
193 See, e.g., Scott, Images in Advertising, supra note 192, at 265 (discussing cosmetics ad 
depicting product submerged in glass of iced water with lime as assuming "an implied viewer 
who exercises selectivity, uses experience with the genre of advertising, and engages in 
metaphorical thinking"). 
194 See Brown, supra note 5, at 1182-83 (questioning consumers' freedom of choice); see 
also Bartholomew, supra note 191, at 30-31 (noting that several social critics of 1950s and 
1960s believed that modern advertising threatened personal autonomy). 
195 See, e.g., Ruby Roy Dholakia & Brian Sternthal, Highly Credible Sources: Persuasive 
Facilitators or Persuasive Liabilities?, 3 J. CONSUMER RES. 223, 224 (1977) (describing 
cognitive response analysis as asserting that "persuasion entails the rehearsal of one's own 
attitude-relevant thoughts as well as those contained in a communication"); Marian Friestad 
& Peter Wright, The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion 
Attempts, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 3 (1994) ("[W]e do not assume that people invariably or 
even typically use their persuasion knowledge to resist a persuasion attempt. Rather, their 
overriding goal is simply to maintain control over the outcome(s) and thereby achieve 
whatever mix of goals is salient to them."). 
196 See supra Part II.A. 
197 See Avery M. Abernethy & George R. Franke, The Information Content of Advertising: 
A Meta-Analysis, J. ADVERTISING, Summer 1996, at 1, 1 (noting empirical evidence that 
consumers prefer advertising that aids in decision making); Linda M. Scott, The Bridge from 
Text to Mind: Adapting Reader-Response Theory to Consumer Research, 21 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 461, 476-78 (1994) (advocating reader response approach to consumer research). 
198 See Scott, supra note 197, at 464 (" '[R]eading as consumers' means understanding the 
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the advertising in question is highly informative or appeals to 
emotions; consumers that have become skeptical of informational 
claims in advertising may still respond to emotional appeals.199 
A necessary part ofthis process, therefore, is the ability to make 
mistakes: to spend money frivolously, to engage in indiscretions, to 
assign value to the status of a good rather than to any inherent 
difference in quality. Consumers have demonstrated an interest in 
identifying themselves as, say, Coke drinkers or Pepsi drinkers, and 
in a commercial age this alignment is as much a part of one's 
personal development as the decision to vote for a school tax levy or 
not. As Sidney J. Levy notes, "the discretionary society might better 
be termed the indiscretionary society, since it is often the freedom 
to be indiscreet and to indulge one's imprudent choices that makes 
the freedom seem real. "20° Consumers learn from this freedom in a 
feedback loop-they may purchase the high-end sports car or 
handbag and believe that the prestige associated with the 
trademark entirely justifies the high price, or they may be 
disappointed to discover that they are in much the same station in 
life as before (albeit many dollars poorer).201 Indeed, the law 
text as an effort to sell, which in tum implies not only issues of brand awareness or product 
attribute beliefs, but also outright skepticism and resistance."); id. at 4 73 (recommending 
shift in consumer research from seeing consumer as "a mind whose sole function is to absorb 
brand information" to seeing advertisements as "text(s] that the consumer is using to fulfill 
a purpose of his or her own"); see also STEPHEN BROWN, POSTMODERN MARKETING 138 (1995) 
("Consumers are no longer portrayed as malleable, simple-minded dupes held in marketing's 
mendacious thrall, but as astute, discerning, self-aware individuals who enjoy shopping and 
identity transformation, are fluent in the language of advertising and revel in the whole 
consumption experience, yet at the same time remain capable of ironic detachment, doughty 
resistance and subverting rather than succumbing to the machinations of marketing and 
multinational capital."). Not every commentator is as sanguine. See, e.g., Janice Winship, 
Sexuality for Sale, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE, supra note 184, at 217, 220 (describing 
interpretation ofsexually-themed advertisements as involving "contradictory modes in which 
we, as readers, are inescapably ensnared in the signification process" (emphasis added)). 
199 Carl Obermiller, Eric Spangenberg & Douglas L. MacLachlan, Ad Skepticism: The 
Consequences of Disbelief, J. ADVERTISING, Fall2005, at 7, 15. 
200 Sidney J. Levy, The Discretionary Society, in BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS & 
RESEARCH 319, 323-24 (Dennis W. Rooked., 1999); cf Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property 
Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455, 470 (1978) (characterizing libertarian 
view of privacy law as believing that suppression of truthful information "is unwarranted, 
even if the person who hears it might misuse or misinterpret it"). 
201 See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcoN. 729, 751 (1974) ("It 
does not pay consumers to make very thoughtful decisions about advertising. They can 
respond to advertising for the most ridiculous explicit reasons and still do what they would 
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supports this kind of learning curve, since it does not seek to 
regulate the fantasy or fictional aspects of advertising. A cologne 
manufacturer can run a commercial suggesting that wearers of its 
product will instantly become attractive to women, or a sportswear 
manufacturer can suggest that buying its athletic shoes will 
transform a consumer into a professional basketball player, and the 
law does not intervene, leaving it to consumers to learn the harsh 
reality on their own.202 
Focusing on the reader/consumer as an autonomous being with 
First Amendment interests might therefore lead us to reconsider 
certain aspects of current trademark doctrine as being either 
consistent with or antagonistic to this viewpoint.203 Cabined 
appropriately, trademark infringement doctrine-focusing on 
likelihood of confusion-seems aligned with the consumer/reader's 
First Amendment interests. Consumers will have difficulty 
exercising their autonomy to direct the outcome of their lives if they 
are being misled. But modern expansions of the doctrine prove more 
problematic. These aspects of trademark law focus on the 
persuasive aspects of the mark and not on the informational 
aspects;204 to the extent these aspects can be said to "mislead," it is 
only because the law has determined that choices based on these 
persuasive aspects would not be beneficial to consumers. An 
have done ifthey made the most careful judgments about their behavior .... If it were not in 
consumer self-interest to respond to advertising, then consumers' sloppy thinking about 
advertising would cost enough that they would reform their ways."). 
202 See Litman, supra note 171, at 1729 n. 73 ("If consumers willingly suspend their 
disbelief a little because it is pleasant to imagine that eating Snackwell's cookies will make 
one thin, [or] that reading Forbes magazine will make one rich, ... perhaps it is a cheap way 
for folks to get a little of what they want without actually being fooled-or being fooled 
much."); Smolla, supra note 146, at 802-03 (arguing that there is little harm in consumers 
fantasizing about such claims and that regulation of such ads is unwarranted); Sullivan, 
supra note 60, at 157 ("(M]ost of what Madison Avenue sells is product image. Even under 
the existing notion that the government has broad leeway to control misleading commercial 
speech, it is not generally claimed that such imagistic associations are deceptive."); cf Be Vier, 
supra note 25, at 38 (suggesting that courts adjudicating false advertising claims "ought to 
interpret ads so that only those representations that present substantial risk of distorting 
consumer decisionmaking become predicates for liability"). 
203 There are, of course, other bases for explaining various expansions of trademark law. 
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 2143-80 (discussing sponsorship confusion and trade dress 
law). 
204 See supra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text. 
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autonomy theory of consumers, however, would conclude that 
consumers should make this determination on their own. 
Consider, first, dilution law. Although dilution doctrine has been 
characterized as improperly treating trademarks as property or as 
protecting undesirable prestige value,205 it is also vulnerable from 
a consumer autonomy perspective. In a paradigmatic dilution 
action, the consumer is not confused as to the source of the 
defendant's good or service-she knows, for example, that the maker 
of "Kodak pianos" is not affiliated with the camera 
manufacturer-but now considers the Kodak mark to be less unique 
or distinctive (or, in the case of a tarnishment action, considers the 
mark less favorably). 206 Where there was once a single Kodak, the 
dilution cause of action sees a thousand, turning what was once 
special into something commonplace or disreputable. As a result, 
one theory postulates, the consumer takes longer to make the 
mental connection between the mark and the product because she 
must first mentally discard the other associations with that mark. 207 
A trademark owner claiming dilution is therefore saying, as I have 
noted elsewhere: "[W]e have spent a lot of money and effort on 
telling consumers what they should think about our brand, and the 
defendant's activities have caused them to think something 
different. "208 
205 See Brown, supra note 5, at 1191-94 (describing historical rationale behind dilution 
doctrine as protecting mark holder's reputation and ability to expand); Robert N. Klieger, 
Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 
U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 851 (1997) (noting undesirability of bestowing senior mark holders with 
property rights in trademarks); Lemley, supra note 177, at 1698-99 (criticizing expansion of 
dilution doctrine). 
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (providing cause of action for dilution of famous marks). 
207 See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that 
association of mark with variety of unrelated products imposes "higher imagination cost[s]"); 
Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1148 (2006) ("The idea underlying the concept of 
[dilution by] blurring is that the defendant's use of a mark similar or identical to the 
plaintiffs mark will 'blur' the link between the plaintiffs mark and the goods or services to 
which the plaintiffs mark is traditionally attached."); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty 
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEx. L. REV. 507, 519--21 (2008) 
("[B]lurring takes place when a single term activates multiple, nonconfusing associations in 
a consumer's mind."). 
208 Heymann, supra note 7, at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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From a consumer autonomy perspective, it is questionable that 
the trademark owner should have control over this association. 
Assuming that the consumer encountering "Kodak pianos" is not 
engaging with the trademark for its search value-in other words, 
she is not using the mark to buy pianos from the same producer 
from which she buys film-then she is reacting, if at all, to the 
meaning she attributes to the Kodak brand. It might mean that the 
association of "Kodak" with "pianos" now takes precedence in her 
mind over the association of"Kodak" with "film," or it might mean 
that it takes her longer to call up the association of "Kodak" with 
"film." But it is only if we believe that the film company has the 
right to claim priority in the consumer's mind about what "Kodak" 
will mean to her that a dilution action seems defensible.209 So long 
as the consumer is clear about which producer she is dealing with, 
autonomy considerations would suggest that she has a right 
superior to that of the film company to decide which company she 
thinks of first when she hears the term. Indeed, this decision may 
well be tied to other aspects of her self-determination, much as 
whether the term "Delta" means "airline" or "faucet" to any 
particular consumer may depend on whether that consumer 
dedicates more time to air travel or to home improvement. 
Even if the purported harm consists of what some commentators 
have termed a "halo effect"210 (a harm about which other 
commentators have conveyed skepticism211), the autonomy concern 
is the same. To take one example, the name "Rolex" is synonymous 
to many consumers with high quality and exclusivity. A bakery that 
calls itself the "Rolex Bakery" will probably not confuse consumers 
209 Indeed, since dilution protection applies only to marks that are famous, these would 
seem to be precisely the kinds of marks that would be capable of surviving such an onslaught. 
Beebe, supra note 207, at 1162; Tushnet, supra note 207, at 541-42 ("Fame may preserve the 
unidirectionality of associations from a junior brand to a senior by keeping the senior brand's 
own associations at the forefront of consumers' minds."). 
210 See Swann, supra note 175, at 967 ("Cognitive research establishes that copycat 
packaging, even though bearing a clearly distinguishable brand name so as to avoid 
confusion ... benefits from a 'halo effect' of a leading brand's packaging."). Trademark 
proponents like Swann also argue that this effect, while beneficial for the trademark 
defendant, impairs the recall for the trademark plaintiff. Id. at 967-68. 
211 See Beebe, supra note 207, at 1164-65 (noting that misappropriation of trademark per 
se is not actionable under U.S. law); Tushnet, supra note 207, at 524-25 (discussing doubt 
about "free riding" meaning of dilution). 
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into thinking that the watchmaker has gone into the baked goods 
business, but the bakery might benefit from the associations 
surrounding the term "Rolex." The bakery, the argument goes, now 
gets to free-ride on Rolex's reputation. It doesn't have to spend time 
and effort establishing a reputation for high-quality goods but can 
simply use the Rolex name to create that impression in consumers' 
minds. And this is true (under the "halo effect" theory) even if the 
bakery clearly states that it is not associated in any way with the 
watch company. If this is the harm at issue, the theory is one that 
especially seems to deny consumer autonomy. As long as the 
consumer understands that the Rolex Bakery is not affiliated with 
the watchmaker (and in an age of pervasive branding, this may be 
open to question212), it should be left to the consumer to determine 
whether the persuasive effect of the "Rolex" mark is enough to make 
her want to patronize the bakery. 
As another example ofhow autonomy considerations might affect 
doctrine, consider the expansion of traditional trademark 
infringement to include additional concepts of"confusion." Even in 
the standard infringement suit-where the trademark holder must 
show that the defendant's activity has created a likelihood of 
confusion as to source among the relevant consumer market--courts 
have had a love-hate relationship with consumers: Consumers are 
sometimes very savvy about marketing strategies and products, and 
sometimes not, in need of assistance and sometimes not, with little 
to guide reaction as to when assistance is needed. 213 Although the 
marketing literature seems to take account of the interpretive skills 
required oftoday's consumer, courts' characterizations of consumers 
have used the transformation of the mark from simple source 
identifier to more complex transmitter of aura and associations to 
opposite effect. Mark Bartholomew suggests that when trademarks 
were used more directly to convey information, courts were 
correspondingly more trusting of consumers, only recognizing 
212 See Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. 
REv. 731, 789 (2003) (suggesting that trademark owners dilute their own marks through 
broad uses). 
213 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 723 (2004) 
(querying why judges in trademark litigation "so often write about representative members 
of the public as if we are astoundingly nai've, stunningly gullible, and frankly stupid"). 
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confusion that persisted after a "reasonable investigation of the 
defendant's product. "214 As trademarks became more numerous and 
were communicated to consumers through techniques designed to 
persuade as well as to inform, courts (perhaps not surprisingly) 
came to view consumers as requiring a higher degree of protection. 
Faced with an ever-increasing array of competitors for mindshare, 
consumers were thought to select products quickly and with little 
forethought. 215 
But even in today's market, where trademarks carry multiple 
messages, the use of trademark law to regulate the marketplace is 
consistent with consumer autonomy, since without such regulation 
consumers would not be able to obtain the products they want 
without considerable investigation as to the qualities of those 
products. 216 In this respect, trademark law parallels the First 
Amendment cases in that it works to clear the market of fraudulent 
efforts to interfere with autonomy. 217 Consistent with the Kantian 
view that individual autonomy is to be respected by government 
only so long as it does not interfere with the autonomy rights of 
others, 218 trademark law is well within its bounds to ensure that 
producers do not engender confusion among their consumers by 
sending misleading signals about the source of their product, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally. 
But other theories of infringement do not map as well onto these 
concerns. Consider the common practice of a producer using 
packaging similar to a competitor's trade dress in order to convey to 
consumers that the products are comparable. The store-brand 
214 Bartholomew, supra note 191, at 7. Bartholomew cites several examples, including 
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877), in which the Court required "careful inspection 
to distinguish the spurious trade-mark from the genuine" in order to maintain a cause of 
action, and Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co., 122 F. 796,798 (8th Cir. 1903), in which 
the circuit court required reasonable examination of packaging. 
215 Bartholomew, supra note 191, at 10 ("While the Victorian-era consumer was expected 
to exercise some caution in the commercial world, the early 1900s consumer was 'apt to act 
quickly, and [was) therefore not expected to exercise a high degree of caution.' " (alteration 
in original) (citing Paris Med. Co. v. W.H. Hill Co., 102 F. 148, 151 (6th Cir. 1900))). 
216 See Bone, supra note 15, at 2117-18 (characterizing trademark law as protecting 
against source-identifying word marks, direct competitors, and source confusion at point of 
purchase). 
217 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
218 Wells, supra note 54, at 167. 
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shampoo, laundry detergent, or garbage bags are likely to be 
packaged in bottles or boxes that closely resemble those of the 
name-brand products to indicate to consumers the equivalence in 
their formulas or materials. As several commentators have noted, 
the likelihood of confusion in such situations is low.219 The store-
brand product is almost certainly placed on the shelf next to the 
name-brand product (the geographic proximity serving as both a 
communication and a convenience), giving the consumer a ready 
opportunity to differentiate between the two products. 220 More 
important, as long as the store-brand product is marked with the 
name of the store, the consumer is not likely to use the trade dress 
in order to identify a producer; rather, she will interpret it as an 
attempt to persuade her that she will be just as happy with the 
lower-priced store brand as with the name-brand product. Thus, 
consideration of her autonomy interest would counsel a finding of 
infringement (or false advertising) only when the defendant has 
made a false statement (e.g., claiming it is the name brand or 
claiming it is the identical formulation when it is not) but not when 
the trade dress is used merely for its persuasive effect.221 
Autonomy interests might also cause courts to think differently 
about cases involving theories of confusion as to authorization or 
endorsement. The merchandising cases are typical examples of such 
theories, where courts find a likelihood of confusion when a 
defendant puts the plaintiffs logo (such as a sports team or college 
logo) on a hat or T-shirt without authorization.222 The argument is 
219 See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 213, at 766 ("[A]ny question about whether consumers can 
tell the difference between [store-brand and name-brand products] can usually be 
straightforwardly answered as follows: Of course they can."). 
22il See McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d 
Cir. 2007) ("Consumers are generally aware of the name of the store in which they are 
shopping. They are aware that stores have private-label brands that in most cases are 
merchandised next to the national-brand products. Prices for the products are typically 
displayed prominently. Consumers can, therefore, see the cost difference between store 
brands and national brands."). 
221 Rochelle Dreyfuss has advocated approaching this distinction through a multifaceted 
concept of trademark use. See Dreyfuss, supra note 144, at 270 ("[U]se [of a trademark] to 
persuade (through, for example, comparative ads and gripe sites) . . . [should] not be 
considered the type of use with which trademark law is concerned."). 
222 Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 510 
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) is the paradigmatic case. See also, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 
I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998) ("For a party to suggest to the public, through its use 
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that the presence of the logo conveys to consumers the false message 
that the entity affiliated with the logo has authorized the 
appearance ofthe logo on the defendant's product, even though the 
entity likely had no other involvement with the production of the 
good. 223 In this sense, the logo functions in the same way as a 
celebrity endorsement: a familiar face who lends his authority to 
the product and persuades the consumer to select it, thus creating 
a transfer of meaning flowing from the endorser and through the 
goods to the consumer. 224 
But even assuming this is descriptively correct, it is unclear why 
trademark law should have much work to do here. Even if the 
consumer views the presence of the logo as a signal of endorsement, 
of another's mark or a similar mark, that it has received permission to use the mark on its 
goods or services suggests approval, and even endorsement, of the party's product or service 
and is a kind of confusion the Lanham Act prohibits."); Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. 
Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 n.28 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[l)n our view, most consumers who 
purchase products containing the name or emblem of their favorite school or sports team 
would prefer an officially sponsored or licensed product to an identical non-licensed product. 
Were this not true, the word 'official' would not appear in so many advertisements for such 
products."); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 
F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979) ("In order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that 
the owner of the mark actually produced the item and placed it on the market. The public's 
belief that the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark 
satisfies the confusion requirement." (citations omitted)). 
223 As James Gibson, among others, has noted, the fuzziness ofthe terminology is reflected 
in the legal analysis. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 910-11 (2007) ("[A] s courts employ a variety of decreasingly 
analogous synonyms for sponsorship and approval, the focus shifts from whether the plaintiff 
sponsored or approved of the defendant's product to whether the plaintiff acquiesced in the 
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark."). Indeed, given the prevalence of product placements 
in film and television programs, consumers might be forgiven for thinking that the entity 
affiliated with the logo paid the apparel manufacturer for the placement of the logo rather 
than the reverse. 
224 See Grant McCracken, Who Is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of the 
Endorsement Process, 16 J. CONSUMER REs. 310, 314 (1989) ("Consumers must take 
possession ofthese meanings and put them to work in the construction of their notions of the 
self and the world."). McCracken asserts that this effort is due, at least in part, to a 
breakdown in traditional social structures that have obviated the need for individual self-
determination. See id. at 318 ("[l]ndividualism and alienation have conspired to give 
individuals new freedom to define matters of gender, class, age, personality, and lifestyle. 
The freedom to choose is now also an obligation to decide ... . ");see also Madow, supra 
note 177, at 142-43 ("Indeed, it is only because celebrity images carry and provoke meaning 
that they can enhance the marketability of the commodities with which they are associated. 
Their 'associative' or 'publicity' value derives from their semiotic power." (footnote omitted)). 
This is true, as Madow notes, whether the celebrity image that is involved is the ector herself 
or the character she plays. I d. at 199 n.350. 
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she is not engaging with the mark in its source-identifying sense. 
In other words, she is probably not using the mark to glean 
anything about the qualities of the apparel to which the logo is 
affixed.225 Rather, she is engaging with the persuasive aspect of the 
mark. As with the celebrity endorser, the logo is conveying the 
message that it is in some way preferable to buy the branded 
product-that aT-shirt with a Boston Red Sox logo is a "better" T-
shirt than one without the logo. This is not because the logo 
communicates source-that is, that the Red Sox produce high-
quality T-shirts-but because the logo itself is of(expressive) value. 
Consumers who purchase a branded T -shirt want to be like other 
purchasers (if only insofar as they enjoy the same sports team), just 
like consumers who respond to a celebrity endorsement want, in 
some small way, to be like the celebrity (if only insofar as they enjoy 
the same product). Once again, considerations of consumer 
autonomy would leave it to the consumer to decide whether this is 
a legitimate assertion. There is little qualitative difference for 
autonomy purposes among these statements: "The hamburgers at 
Joe's Diner are not worth the five dollars it charges for them"; "Tiger 
Woods thinks that you should buy this razor"; and "This is a more 
desirable T-shirt because it has a Red Sox logo on it." Each 
statement depends on the persuasiveness of the speaker for effect, 
and so each remains the domain of the consumer to regulate, even 
if we might characterize his choice to believe any of these assertions 
as foolish. 226 
225 It is possible that the consumer believes that the trademark owner would license its 
mark for use only on high-quality goods, but I suspect this is unlikely. In any event, the 
consumer can assess many of these qualities for herself through inspection. 
226 Ellen Goodman notes how this operates in the commercial news media: 
The agenda of the commercial media, assuming nothing but a profit 
motive, is to attract audience attention. In offering content on this basis, 
the editor makes a validity claim combining truth and sincerity. She says, 
in effect, "You like this communication,~ or "I think you will like it.~ The 
same cannot be said for the sponsor. The sponsor seeks not to please the 
audience with its communication, but to use communication to induce 
action. An editor speaking a sponsor's promotional message and 
advancing the sponsor's agenda cannot redeem a claim to either sincerity 
or truth. 
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEx. L. REv. 83, 119 (2006). 
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Trademark law, by contrast, is better left to ensuring the absence 
of false statements of fact. As long as the defendant has not falsely 
suggested authorization,227 any further use of a mark of the type 
discussed here should be permissible. And to the extent the 
consumer is simply seeking out the mark for its pure communicative 
function-to signal affiliation with the team or school it 
represents-then autonomy has an even greater role to play and 
trademark law a lesser one. In this scenario, the use of the 
trademark by the consumer is at the core of identity formation. She 
is purchasing the good because she accepts whatever meaning is 
conveyed by the mark apart from its indication of the quality of the 
good.228 
Another expansion of what constitutes "confusion," which might 
be rethought with the infusion of autonomy concerns, is the doctrine 
of initial interest confusion. In the typical initial interest confusion 
case, the defendant "improperly uses a trademark to create initial 
customer interest in a product, even if the customer realizes, prior 
to purchase, that the product was not actually manufactured by the 
trademark-holder."229 For example, in a dispute between Mobil 
w Following Mcintyre , true ascriptive autonomy may not even require a statement as to 
authorization. See discussion supra Part II.B. I . To the extent that the consumer believes the 
assertion that aT-shirt bearing a Red Sox logo is somehow "better" than a plainT-shirt, it 
should not matter who is making that assertion. Cf. Goodman, supra note 226, at 87-88 
(arguing that regulation of undisclosed sponsor marketing is necessary because consumers 
are not equipped to sort out competing claims on their own). However, as in Pinette, courts 
may deem the autonomous consumer to be someone who "would certainly be able to read and 
understand an adequate disclaimer." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753, 782 (1995) (O'Connor, J ., concurring). In addition, consumers may want to ensure 
that their money goes to the trademark holder and not to another entity, in which case a 
statement or disclaimer as to authorization may be important. 
228 See, e.g., Int1 Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F .2d 912, 918 (9th 
Cir. 1980) ("We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing allegiances. 
Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the organizations 
we belong to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports teams we 
support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently include names and 
emblems that are also used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive to conclude 
that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product somehow 
originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem signifies."). But 
see, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1049 (3d Cir. 1982) 
("[W]hatever the ultimate scope of protection afforded, the crucial element is consumer desire 
to associate with the entity whose imprint is reproduced. This desire is based on success or 
notoriety which, in turn, is a result of the efforts of that entity."). 
229 Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F .3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Oil-which uses a flying horse as its logo-and a company called 
Pegasus Petroleum, the Second Circuit found it relevant to the 
confusion determination that even though third parties would 
ultimately know which party they were dealing with by the time a 
sale was concluded, "Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial 
credibility during the initial phases of a deal .... because of the 
possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil."230 
As with the comparative trade dress example discussed earlier, 231 
autonomy considerations help distinguish uses that are properly the 
province of trademark law from those that are for the consumer to 
negotiate. To the extent the defendant is using the mark for its 
source-identifying function (e.g., to tell the customer that the 
plaintiff's product is available when it is not), this use interferes 
with consumer autonomy much as do false or misleading facts and 
is thus properly regulated by trademark law.232 But to the extent 
that the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark for its persuasive 
valu~ither as a lure to attract consumers, with the hope that the 
consumers will, once attracted, choose the defendant's product 
instead, or to provide relevant information about the plaintiff (e.g., 
a trademark used as a keyword in a search engine)-that use seems 
consistent with the consumer's autonomy interest. When the mark 
is used for persuasion, the consumer is not being misled by the 
defendant's activity since the plaintiff's product is available. She is 
therefore merely deciding whether the goodwill bound up in the 
plaintiff's mark is persuasive enough to lure her in and keep her 
attention. For example, a supermarket that advertises "Icy Cold 
Coca-Cola Inside!" when all that is offered is the store-brand cola 
230 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987). 
231 See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text. 
232 The FTC also characterizes this activity (the classic bait-and-switch) as an unfair trade 
practice. See 16 C.F.R. § 424.1 (2008) (deeming it unfair trade practice for retail food store 
"to offer any [grocery] products for sale at a stated price, by means of an advertisement 
disseminated in an area served by any stores which are covered by the advertisement, if those 
stores do not have the advertised products in stock and readily available to customers during 
the effective period of the advertisement, unless the advertisement clearly and adequately 
discloses that supplies of the advertised products are limited or the advertised products are 
available only at some outlets"); id. § 424.2 (finding no violation if"[t]he advertised products 
were ordered in adequate time for delivery in quantities sufficient to meet reasonably 
anticipated demand," or retailer offers raincheck, similar product at comparable price 
reduction, or other compensation). 
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(with the hope that consumers, once inside, will take a second-best 
offering to avoid having to renew their search) is autonomy-
interfering; a supermarket that places the same sign outside when 
both Coca-Cola and the store-brand cola are offered (with the hope 
that consumers, once inside, will decide they prefer the cheaper soft 
drink) is autonomy-enhancing. 233 Transferring this example to the 
online search engine context yields the same result: The use of a 
trademark to trigger a list of search results that includes not only 
the trademark owner's site but also other sites that may be of 
interest to the consumer is consistent with autonomous choice and 
thus should be outside the reach of trademark law.234 
Thus, in each of these areas of trademark law, a consideration of 
the consumer's First Amendment-based autonomy interests can 
help determine the appropriate role of trademark law. Where the 
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark is the equivalent of a false 
statement of fact-relying on the source-identifying aspects of the 
mark-trademark law's role is properly robust. But where the 
defendant is exploiting the persuasive aspects of the plaintiffs mark 
(the aspect ofthe mark that attempts to tell the consumer why the 
product is desirable), vigorously applied trademark law will deprive 
the consumer of the ability to engage with the mark on her own 
terms, to make her own associations with the mark, and to decide 
for herself whether she believes the message of quality, status, or 
prestige that the mark is conveying. 
It is true that autonomy is not without its costs. AB David 
Strauss notes, a theory that gives us a general principle of 
permissible government interference may not be helpful in resolving 
233 It is, of course, a common practice for merchants to advertise a name-brand good for 
sale (often at a highly reduced price), hoping that consumers will fill their carts with 
additional merchandise once inside. See, e.g., Rajiv Lai & Carmen Matutes, Retail Pricing 
and Advertising Strategies, 67 J. Bus. 345, 346 (1994) (noting role of advertising as a 
"commitment device" and that "loss leaders do attract consumers into the store even if they 
are rational and expect to pay very high prices for unadvertised goods"). 
234 Judge Berzon's concurrence in Playboy Enterprises International, Inc. v. Netscape 
Communications Corp., a keyed Internet advertisement case, speaks to this point. See 354 
F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) ("There is a big difference between 
hijacking a customer to another website by making the customer think he or she is visiting 
the trademark holder's website (even if only briefly) ... and just distracting a potential 
customer with another choice, when it is clear that it is a choice."). 
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any particular case because it takes too "thin" a view of how 
individuals reason in any particular situation. 235 Consumers are not 
always capable of making rational judgments about how to engage 
with trademarks in the marketplace, and so, by definition, an 
ascriptive view of the consumer holds some consumers to a higher 
standard than they can meet in practice. As a result, some 
consumers will experience higher psychic and economic costs of 
participation in the marketplace. This is particularly incongruous 
for an area of the law that relies heavily on surveys to determine 
consumer reaction to trademarks, and so purports to care at least 
somewhat about what individuals actually think. 236 But the law is 
no stranger to this phenomenon, as the First Amendment cases and 
tort law's "reasonable person" standard demonstrate. 237 And 
trademark law is no exception, given that not all confusion can be 
remedied. Today's consumers have an increasing number of ways 
to research products before they buy them, along with multiple 
avenues for expressing their opinions about their experiences with 
the products. 238 There is therefore nothing inherently wrong with 
the law reflecting an expectation that consumers will avail 
themselves of these opportunities; indeed, there can be a benefit to 
the law's setting norms rather than merely reflecting them, so long 
as we believe those norms rest on appropriate foundations. 239 As 
235 Strauss, supra note 55, at 370. 
236 See Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases: 
A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 747 (2000) ("[S)urvey evidence 
has become de rigueur in trademark infringement cases."). 
237 See supra Part II.B. 
236 See, e.g., Rob Walker, The Brand Underground, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 6 
(Magazine), at 29, 31 ("It is often said that this generation of teenagers and 20-somethings 
is the most savvy one ever in its ability to critique and understand commercial persuasion, 
and it is probably true -just as it was true when the same thing was said of Generation X 
and of the baby boomers before that."). See generally Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth 
and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 144, at 404 (discussing effect of online reviews and 
"online word of mouth" on consumer perceptions). 
239 See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2068 ("As currently understood, trademark law is a 
primarily descriptive enterprise, one which seeks simply to insure that market information 
is accurately conveyed and comprehended .... The law commands that courts assess whether 
or not consumers are actually confused, not whether or not they should be confused."); Stacey 
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 
EMORY L.J. 461, 487 (2005) ("The real underlying issue is whether the trademark law should 
act ... as a creator or as a reflector of societal norms."). 
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Julie Cohen theorized, albeit in a different context: "Autonomous 
individuals do not spring full-blown from the womb. We must learn 
to process information and to draw our own conclusions about the 
world around us. We must learn to choose, and must learn 
something before we can choose anything. "240 Allowing the 
consumer to engage with trademarks' various associations without 
interference from trademark law is a necessary part of this learning 
process. 
As with the discussion of the First Amendment cases above, 241 my 
goal here is modest. It is not to suggest that consideration of the 
consumer as an autonomous being answers every trademark 
question, that the autonomy interest is as robust as in the First 
Amendment cases,242 or even that the autonomy interest might not 
be outweighed by other, more important interests. Rather, my goal 
is to demonstrate that consumer autonomy has been an 
underappreciated interest to date and that trademark doctrine 
would do well to recognize it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In many areas of intellectual property law, commentators have 
identified the importance of focusing on the recipients of 
information-readers, viewers, and listeners-as equal to speakers 
in their role as participants in the making of meaning.243 The 
:uo Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1424 (2000) (advocating"zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny 
and interference" (i.e., data privacy) to allow development of autonomy). 
241 See supra Part II.B. 
242 Cf. Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Juris prudence, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 1517, 1526 (1997) (reviewing FISS, supra note 51, and distinguishing "democratic 
citizens" from consumers on ground that democratic citizens actively participate in agenda-
setting and framing issues for decision). 
243 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 5, at 2059 (describing cultural populist commentary in 
trademark law as "committed to the view that the consumer is active and critical, both in 
search and preference formation"); Litman, supra note 178, at 1910 (noting that interaction 
with copyrighted works is important right of readers); Madow, supra note 177, at 139 
(describing "cultural populist" conception of popular culture as view that consumers "neither 
uniformly receive nor uncritically accept the 'preferred meanings' that are generated and 
circulated by the culture industry" (footnote omitted)); cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. 
Summum, No. 07-665, slip op. at 12 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2009) ("Even when a monument features 
the written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be 
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consumer is not simply someone with the ability to repurpose speech 
but is also someone who contributes to determining first purposes. 
The attention commentators have paid in recent years to the 
importance of the public domain in copyright law is borne of a 
recognition of the value of allowing consumers of creative expression 
to develop meaning and construct their identities. This 
engagement, in trademark law as in the other fields, is a critical 
part of personal development. Our choices as to what we read, 
listen to, and purchase help to create our identities, define ourselves 
to the world, and develop our critical faculties. 244 In this respect, 
trademark law is no less worthy a candidate for a First Amendment 
theory of the consumer than is copyright law, religious observance, 
or political speech. 
interpreted by observers, in a variety of ways."). 
244 Cf. Brown, supra note 5, at 1198 ("In trade symbol cases, the unwary purchaser is 
scarcely a worthy object for judicial solicitude. . . . The figure of the unwary, casual, 
incautious, unsuspecting purchaser suggests conclusions which those who favor him could 
scarcely confess: that people are not very bright, and that a good deal of persuasion cancels 
out, leaving consumers (bright or not) indifferent as to either origin or advertising of many 
goods." (footnote omitted)); Dreyfuss, supra note 144, at 292 ("[D]esigning [trademark] law 
to protect the reasonable consumer would encourage individuals to develop their facilities."); 
Redish, supra note 59, at 439 ("illfthe individual's intellectual growth is dependent upon an 
opportunity to participate actively in decisions that significantly affect him, what decisions 
affect him more directly than those which he must make concerning matters within the 
private sector of his life?"); Smolla, supra note 146, at 786 ("In an open society there is always 
pressure to believe that money and material will give life meaning .... The very openness, 
however, that ... encourages advertisers to try to make us all materialists[] will also give 
free wheel to the intellectual and entrepreneurial imaginations that hold the best promise for 
genuinely uplifting our quality of life."). 
